

THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

A Thesis

Presented to the

Faculty of the Graduate School of

Angelo State University

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF SECURITY STUDIES

by:

WILLIAM WHITLEY JOHNSON

AUGUST 2012

Major: Security Studies

THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

by

WILLIAM WHITLEY JOHNSON

APPROVED:

Dr Anthony Celso

Dr Robert Ehlers

Dr. Robert Nalbandov

Dr. John Klingemann

August 2012

APPROVED:

Dr. Brian May
Dean of the College of Graduate Studies

DEDICATION

To my loving wife, who is my foundation and has borne the brunt of multiple moves and deployments to support my military and academic goals and pursuits; and to my children, who have grown up in a variety of global locations, adapting exceptionally well to each and every one. Each of you has taught me more about myself and life than you can imagine. I

love all of you!

ABSTRACT

The manner in which the United States understands the background, motivations, and aspirations of the participants in the Arab Spring within the Maghreb Region will have significant implications for the development of future National Security Policy.

In an effort to better quantify this understanding, this work presents an analysis of the following three alternative scenarios: 1) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and Regime Change of Pro American Ally, which is detrimental to U.S. National Security Interests; 2) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and Regime Change of Anti-American regime, which produces a positive change in US National Security Interests; and 3) The Arab Spring leads to a protracted civil war and national dismemberment, which harms US National Security Interests in the region. A thorough analysis of these three possibilities as led to a key realization.

The relative stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco is a definite positive aspect of the post-Arab Spring transition. However, there is still significant instability in Libya as well as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb's (AQIM) continued capability to operate from Mali and southern Algeria. This will make the Maghreb region a potential flash point in Arab-Western relations, and it therefore also makes the Maghreb a region of strategic interest to the United States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Dedication	iii
Abstract	iv
List of Figures	vi
Chapter I - Introduction	1
History of the Maghreb	2
19 th Century	2
20 th Century	4
Current	5
Maghreb Governmental Organization	6
Chapter II – Significance	7
Background	9
Methodology	10
Operational Indicators Defining National Security	12
Definitions and Literature Review	14
Chapter III – Historical Case Studies of the Maghreb Region	16
Algeria	16
Tunisia	21
Morocco	26
Libya	30
Chapter IV – Issues Bearing on the Problem	39
Algeria	40
Tunisia	43
Morocco	45
Libya	48
Chapter V – Recommendations and Conclusion	52
Maghreb Country Comparison	53
Cross Reference of Propositions	57
Recommendations	58
Conclusion	64
Bibliography	66

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 – Algerian Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year	42
Figure 2 – Producers, Net Exporters, and Net Importers of Oil Products	43
Figure 3 – Tunisian Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year	45
Figure 4 – Moroccan Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year	48
Figure 5 – Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year	51
Figure 6 – Failed States Index Excerpt	54
Figure 7 – Median Age	56
Figure 8 – School Life Expectancy	56
Figure 9 – Sub-Saharan Africa, Gulf Most Positive Toward Muslim-West Relations	56
Figure 10 – Protest to Change	57
Figure 11 – Propositions and Islamist Influence	58

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"On December 17, 2010, a policewoman confiscated the unlicensed vegetable cart of a twenty-six-year-old street vendor, Mohamed Bouasisi, in the small Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid. Humiliated by his abuse and exasperated by his inability to get redress, Bouazizi went to a local government building, doused himself with gasoline, and lit himself on fire."¹

Bouasisi's act of defiance may have gone unnoticed by the rest of the world had it not been for the capability provided by globalization. In much the same way as other somewhat isolated incidents have become world events, such as the pictures and videos from Iraq and Afghanistan depicting questionable actions or genocide tactics in the Balkans or Africa, Bouasisi's actions garnered world attention. Once broadcast his grievances and motivations were also publicized. While only one man his actions galvanized a collective feeling across the Arab World which resulted in revolts and riots. The impact of this on the United States and other nations remains to be seen. This work examines the implications of the Arab Spring on the development of U.S. National Security Policy as it applies to the Maghreb region but also the effects these actions had toward the same end within the continental United States (CONUS). This is extremely relevant as we go into a significant era of change across the Middle East, and the importance of this subject for America's national security cannot be overstated. Dr. Dan Schueftan, director of the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, stated, "The Arab Spring has led to deep systemic changes -- mostly

¹. Gideon Rose. *The New Arab Revolt: What Happened, What it Means, and What Comes Next*. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011), Kindle 191 of 6984.

negative -- in the rules of the game throughout the Middle East.”² Though this particular article dealt primarily with the Arab Spring’s effect on Israel, there are common threads associated with the United States, not the least of which is the fact that Israel remains our most trusted and staunchest ally in the Middle East. Dr. Schueftan follows the above remark with one that capitalizes on this relationship between allies: “If this trend persists, it will harm the interests of not only the United States and Israel, but also Arab countries, particularly those that have been longstanding U.S. allies.”³ In addition, as Allen Keiswetter notes, “The Arab Spring has shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. No longer does the US have the prestige and resources to dominate Middle East affairs to the degree it has since the British withdrew from east of Suez in 1971.”⁴ This inability to positively influence the governmental organizations, and specifically those in Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, will force the United States to place significant emphasis on the diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power as opposed to any substantive use of the military instrument to try to maintain diplomatic stability within, and good relationships with, these new governments.

The Maghreb: A Brief Historical Overview

Understanding what effect these developments will have on the future of US National Security Policy is predicated on an understanding of the Maghreb as a whole. “Maghrib,” (Arabic: “West”), also spelled Maghreb, is the region of North Africa bordering the

². Dan Schueftan and Michael Singh. *Arab Spring, Arab Storm: Implications for Israel* (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011), 1.

³. Ibid.

⁴. Allen Keiswetter. *The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interest* (Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2011), 7.

Mediterranean Sea. The “Africa Minor” of the ancients, it at one time included Moorish Spain and now comprises essentially the Atlas Mountains and the coastal plains of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. The weather is characterized by prevailing westerly winds, which drop most of their moisture on the northern slopes of the Atlas Mountains and the coastal plain, leaving little for the southern slopes, which maintain desert scrub fading into true desert in the Sahara to the South.”⁵ The Maghreb region is located roughly 150 miles from Sicily and 9 miles from Spain at the Straits of Gibraltar. This location has made it more prone than the traditional Muslim countries of the Middle East to European influence and colonization.

The 19th Century

This period in the Maghreb region was characterized largely by European colonization. Even with this colonization and the close proximity to Europe the Maghreb was technologically and economically well behind Europe in terms of economic development. In large part as a result of this economic and technological lag, the entry of European influence into the Maghreb Region during this time “allowed cash strapped Middle Eastern governments to spend beyond their means...bankruptcy in the Ottoman Empire and its autonomous provinces in North Africa lowered barriers to more direct forms of European control.”⁶

By the end of the 19th Century, France controlled Tunisia and Italy controlled Libya. Even though Egypt was not officially part of the Maghreb, the fact that it was controlled by a

⁵. Encyclopedia Britanica Online, s.v. “Maghreb.” Accessed 03 February 2012.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/356614/Maghrib>

⁶. Eugene Rogan. *The Arabs, A History*. (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 109.

European power (the British took charge in 1882), had implications for European control across the Maghreb since it extended that dominance across all the countries that border the southern Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, “before the outbreak of the First World War, the whole of North Africa had passed under direct European rule.”⁷ The Maghreb was, officially, part of the Ottoman Empire. However, due to proximity and colonialist intentions, Europe provided military aid and other financial and industrial support to the region—but at a high price in terms of the loss of the local elites’ political control. This was due, in large part, to the fact that the Maghreb Region represented the distant boundaries of the Ottoman Empire but was, for reasons of geography and economics, in Europe’s back yard. One final issue regarding the Maghreb in the 19th Century was the fact that Morocco was the one country that never officially became a European colony. The other three countries all fell to colonial rule early in the 19th Century, while Morocco avoided direct colonial control. Nonetheless, France and Spain signed an agreement to treat it as a protectorate: “[W]hen in 1912 the French set up their protectorate covering most of the country, Morocco was divided...the north became a Spanish protectorate.”⁸ An additional note regarding the European expansion, though, is the fact that its catalyst centered on the French incursion into Algeria in the early 19th Century. Had the French not been successful in their expansionist endeavors, European interests in the region may have been very different.

The 20th Century

Many of the same European colonial ambitions that characterized the previous

⁷. Ibid.

⁸. Heinz Halm, Allison Brown, and Thomas Lampert, Translators. *The Arabs, A Short History*. (New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 133.

century also marked the opening of the 20th Century in the Maghreb. One of the key actions that directed how Europe viewed the Maghreb was the Ottoman Empire's decision to side with the Central Powers during the First World War. In making this decision, European assistance to the government in Constantinople stopped. The Allies, collectively, "abandoned the policy of supporting the 'sick man of Europe' and began planning the partition of the empire."⁹ At the conclusion of the First World War, the victors, with little regard for culture and historical precedent, re-drew the map of the modern Middle East.

Later in the 20th Century, we begin to see more evidence of political discontent within the Maghreb region but also across the greater Middle East. Specific instances of this discontent included incidents of social revolt known as "Bread Riots". According to Anwar Alam, these bread riots were less about hunger and more about an impetus for political change: "[T]hese *intifada* amounted to protests against social inequality, corruption, nepotism, authoritarianism and the regime's incompetence."¹⁰ If nothing else, the riots in Morocco in 1981, Tunisia in 1984, and Algeria in 1988 served as precursors to the events of the Arab Spring. Though not specifically mentioned in Alam's article, Libya's population had many of the same concerns as the people of other Maghreb countries in the mid 1980s—concerns that would play a pivotal role in the eventual explosion of the Arab Spring.

The Maghreb Today

With the actions of one man the fire was set for significant upheaval across the Arab world. Though its affects were felt in Egypt, Syria, and other contemporary Arab locations

⁹. Ibid, 145.

¹⁰. Anwar Alam. *Islam, Bread Riots and Democratic Reforms in North Africa*. Islam and Muslim Societies, A Science Journal. Accessed 11 March 2012.

http://www.muslimsocieties.org/Vol_4_No_1_Islam_Bread_Riots_and_Democratic_Reforms.html#.

the Maghreb felt the sting of the Arab Spring across all four countries in one degree or another. Beginning with Bouazizi's actions and the initial civil actions it generated to the exile or removal of certain countries leaders the Arab Spring substantively changed the Maghreb regions political landscape.

Tunisia's regime has collapsed and is being rebuilt with the first post-Arab Spring Election results finalized in November. Based on official reporting within the country, and publicized by Aljazeera, the "The moderate Islamists of the Ennahda party have won 89 of the 217 seats...the once-banned movement will write the fledgling democracy's new constitution and appoint an interim government ahead of new elections tentatively scheduled for next year."¹¹

In Morocco, though it did not have a change in government per se, the actions of the Arab Spring did convince the King, Mohammad VI, to adjust the country's constitution, giving much more power to the parliament. This becomes critical when a closer examination of the recent elections is conducted: "The victory of an Islamist Party in Morocco's parliamentary elections appears to be one more sign that religious-based parties are benefiting the most from the new freedoms brought by the Arab Spring."¹²

Algeria remains the one country not substantively affected by the Arab Spring, or it would seem so at the surface. However, much of the emphasis regarding its upcoming elections is based on pushing the population to get out and vote. In her article "After the

¹¹. Aljazeera. *Final Tunisian election results announced*. Aljazeera. Accessed 11 March 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111114171420907168.html>.

¹². The Associated Press. *Morocco's Arab Spring election won by Islamists*. USA Today News. Accessed 11 March 2012. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-11-27/morocco-elections-islamist-victory/51421964/1>.

Arab Spring, is Algeria Next in Line for an Islamist Election Victory?” Isabella Mandraud brings out some serious implications to that end. Specifically, she quotes the president of the Social Movement for Peace (MSP) who states, “If the elections are clean and transparent, the people will decide. We are ready, and – from what we’re hearing in the ranks -- very confident”¹³ This is important because the MSP is closely aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, a group which, if it gains power in the region, may not represent the best interests of U.S. national security policy.

Finally, because of the Arab Spring, Libya endured a civil war and is now forming a new government. How this government goes forward, specifically its relations with the United States and the West writ large, remains to be determined. However, if the other countries in the Maghreb are any indication, the sweeping success of Islamist parties in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria leaves little doubt that the same occurrence in Libya is not only possible but probable.

Maghreb Governmental Organization

The underlying condition that shaped the Arab Spring across the Maghreb, and to a point across the Middle East, was a matter of governmental organization. Three of the four countries (Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) had a very rigid single-party government in which the elite held the power. Specifically Libya and Tunisia were dominated by very strong rulers (Gaddafi and Ben Ali), which secured their power through the promotion of family members, trusted associates, and a culture of corruption. Ben Ali’s continued emphasis on the financial

¹³. Bougera Soltani. *After the Arab Spring, is Algeria Next in Line for an Islamist Election Victory*. World Crunch, All News is Global. Accessed 11 March 2012. <http://www.worldcrunch.com/after-arab-spring-algeria-next-line-islamist-election-victory/4588>.

interests of his wife's family and Gaddafi's widely acknowledged use of his son's to control the countries security services are but two examples of this family based corruption. This autocratic leadership characterized by a strong central figure, the identified corrupt culture, and long rule were pivotal catalysts to the rise of the Arab Spring in these two countries. Morocco, though a monarchy, exhibited the same traits with regard to the separation between the elite and common citizens. To say the least, there was little opportunity for upward mobility of the lower classes. At the very worst—a trend evident in all four countries—was a significant lack of human rights and human security. In all four countries this manner of “leadership” eventually caused a conflagration sparked by Mohamed Bouasisi's act of self-immolation. This created the catalyst for change and the events of the Arab Spring, which continue to reverberate to this day, and will do so into the future. However, Morocco remains an outlier as the only monarchy. Its more decentralized governmental structure, though it doesn't remove the gap between the population, may explain why it fared better than the other four during the Arab Spring. Understanding the background, motivations, and aspirations of the Arab Spring's supporters within the Maghreb Region will have a significant impact on the formulation of future US national security Policy.

CHAPTER II

SIGNIFICANCE

As we completed our military actions in Iraq with the re-deployment of the last American military personnel in December of 2011 and have begun a significant reduction in forces in Afghanistan, the obvious question becomes, “What is next?” With the events of the Arab Spring, the next flash point could very likely be any number of areas within the Maghreb region. That said there should be a very real concern for how the governments within those areas form and what direction they choose to follow.

The actions of the US military and NATO forces in support of various rebellions could potentially be a double-edged sword. Those that benefitted from our collective support may see us as saviors because the chances of success without outside assistance would have been minimal. Those same people may also realize, and to a point rightly so, that one of the driving forces behind our support was a philosophical disagreement with the government in power at the time. Should the new government choose a similar path towards serious disagreement with the United States and other Western countries, even if for different reasons, they could be subject to the same fate. In addition to these issues, there are clear concerns about Israel’s place within this new environment: “The Arab Spring has sparked Israeli apprehensions that the relatively stable region of the past several of decades has shifted against them. The Israeli government finds itself more isolated than ever.”¹⁴

¹⁴. Ibid.

With the changing of the guard in Libya, as an example, the United States is in a somewhat precarious position. Our government, along with several NATO countries, assisted the rebellion in an effort to provide the people of Libya with an opportunity to develop a government representative of the people of Libya as opposed to what was in power with Gaddafi. The fact that this assistance could be seen as political as much as ideological is largely irrelevant. Had we not assisted NATO in its assistance of Libya, the political backlash could have negatively impacted operations in Afghanistan and other locations. There is a US face on the Libyan rebellion and to a lesser degree on the Arab Spring writ large. Consequently, what emerges from the Arab Spring across the Maghreb may end up being worse than what existed prior to the recent events. To a point, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco were seldom close allies with the United States or the West. That being said, they represented governments we (the United States) knew and understood though did not trust. Implicit in this new “arrangement” will be a concerted effort to approach the situation with open diplomatic arms in an effort to ensure the national security interests of the United States in this region.

The surprising speed with which the Arab Spring, or Arab Awakening as it is also known, traveled across the Maghreb Arab region and into the greater Middle East, based on both the overt and tacit support by the United States, will have significant effects in both the diplomatic and military arenas. How the United States, and to a lesser degree NATO and the European Union, go forward with diplomatic and military relations with these countries will play a pivotal role in the stability of these emerging governments. Of specific concern is the support provided to the rebels who toppled Mohamar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya. What

remains to be seen is whether the forces we supported will remain friendly to the United States and other Western governments, or if popular feeling within Libya will go the route of Shari' a Law with its strict interpretation and guidance for relations with non-Muslim countries. We can only hypothesize that the relationship will be tenuous at best as these groups vie for power.

Background

The Maghreb has never been a particularly peaceful one. Though this does not mean to imply that the countries within the region were always at war or engaged in conflict, the lack of peace and tranquility, primarily within their own borders, is at the heart of the problem. In addition, looking at the problem from a security policy perspective, it is a region that has ebbed and flowed with regard to its relationship with the United States. Libya, though it had softened its rhetoric in recent years, was the culprit behind the Pan Am Flight 103 terrorist bombing. The removal of Gaddafi has not removed that blight on Libya's record. The other three countries of the Maghreb region tend to maintain decent relations with the United States, but their internal politics will be much more difficult to predict.

The issues that we have seen emerge as a result of the Arab Spring, and more importantly the issues that drove the various countries' citizens to revolt, are not new or unique by any means. The driving force behind this widespread revolt was a combination of a desire for change in treatment (specifically closing the gap between the common man and the elite) and a focus by some groups on a return to a more Muslim focused governmental structure. Some of this discussion centers on a how the population understands the concept of freedom and, to a point, how that same population defines slavery. As discussed in "The

New Arab Revolt; What Happened, What it Means, and What Comes Next”, the very use of freedom and slavery, until recently, had a different connotation in the Arab world than it did in the West: “unlike in the Western World, ‘slavery’ and ‘freedom’ were not until recently used as metaphors for bad and good government.”¹⁵ The understanding of the citizens of all the countries impacted by the Arab Spring was one of repression and, in an Arab/Muslim understanding, a lack of justice resident within the government. Some could say that the realization of this “lack of justice” is a result of globalization and the access that, up until recently, was restricted to very few people within these countries. One point to be made, though, is that the restriction of perquisites to the elites was much less a function of the government in particular as it was a function of a lack of money with which to support this global connectivity, and thus the common peoples’ prosperity, at the local level. The fact that the capability was or was not restricted by the government is also somewhat irrelevant. The citizens of a country look to their government, whether overtly or simply by assumption, to protect them and provide for their safety, security, and freedom to work. When by their action or lack thereof this is proven inaccurate, the eventual result is either continued submission to the status quo because of a lack of will to fight or revolt, or a decision to revolt. In this case the result was revolt across many countries.

Methodology

The American people, for the most part, are idealistic. The desire to see other nation’s populations afforded the same rights and privileges we enjoy can sometimes cloud the reality of the situation. However, the version of democracy that emerges in the Maghreb,

¹⁵. Rose. *The New Arab Revolt*. Kindle 799 of 6984.

specifically Libya, may not be what Americans have envisioned. While there is a segment of the population that realizes this, there are those who are looking for a traditional US model of democracy. In the end, as long as the government that develops is one that is recognized and desired by the people then it is “democratic” in its development.

In beginning the study of the Arab Spring, an important decision must be reached on how to approach the research. It is this researcher’s intent to proceed from an exploratory standpoint. The goal is to examine the historical significance of the Arab Spring in the context of past events of a similar nature; the significance of the current actions; and finally the impact these events have had and will have on US national security policy. Some comparison between the social attitudes and actions of past event timelines to those that were in place in December of 2010 will be required in order to gain a more accurate understanding of the driving forces of the recent revolts. In addition, as the research continues, the development of various governmental structures in Tunisia and Libya will also play a pivotal role in the research.

In order to develop a starting point from which to assess the effects of the Arab Spring, specifically in the Maghreb Region, three possible options present themselves:

- 1) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and regime change of an American ally, which is detrimental to US national security interests.

- 2) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and regime change of an Anti-American regime, which produces—or at least could produce—a positive change in US national security interests.

- 3) The Arab Spring leads to a protracted civil war and national dismemberment, which harms U.S. national security interests in the region.

With these propositions as a starting point, and in an effort to better quantify the research, this essay provides some operational measures to gauge the effects of the Arab Spring in the Maghreb Region on US national security. The data for this research comes primarily from library and online research utilizing a mix of primary and secondary sources. Specific primary sources include information from organizations like the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center dealing with its study of Muslim West relations. Specific secondary source examples would be historical perspectives of the Maghreb as it applies to Western national security interests. Specific data that will be analyzed are illustrated below in the breakdown of the operational measures. The final element of the methodology involves optimum analysis of the data. We will use a mix of inferential statistics and narrative analysis. The inferential statistics will be based on the various Gallup Polls and on those of other organizations like the UN and their development reports, as well as the various country indices available that track actions within the Arab world, again concentrating on the Maghreb region. The narrative analysis comes from the case studies and literature published on the current state of the Maghreb as well as the historical context from which the Arab Spring developed. The foundation of this research will be based on information and research provided by the Gallup Muslim-West Perception Index (December 2011), Foreign Affairs Failed State Index (2007-2011), Gallup Center for Muslim Studies Reports, and country specific reports.

Operational Indicators Defining National Security

For the purposes of this study U.S. national security interests are defined along the five goals posited below and on the following page. Each goal is further operationalized to gauge the impact of the Arab Spring between 2009, shortly before the popular revolts in

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and the current period.

I. Prevent Terrorist Sanctuary

- Country rating on Failed State Index—the higher it is the more likely terrorist network will emerge
- Country rating on Muslim-West perspectives index constructed by Gallup Muslim-West on Global Perceptions index—the more negative the country's view of the West the more likely that terror groups will be offered sanctuary
- Extremist versus Moderate attitudes in Country—the higher the level of extremism the more likely terror networks will be supported
- Support for Al Qaeda—the higher the support the more likely the radical terror network will emerge

II. Keep Arab Allies of U.S. in Power

- Country rating on Failed state index—the lower the country's rating the more likely the regime will remain in power
- Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more positive the country view of the West the more likely the regime will persist
- Extremist versus Moderate attitudes in country—the more moderate the population the more likely the regime will remain in power
- Support for Al Qaeda—the less support the group has in the country the more likely the regime will remain in power

III. Contain and Diminish Anti-American Regimes and Groups

- Country rating on failed state index—the higher the rating the more likely anti-American extremist groups will emerge
- Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more negative the country toward the West the less likely a containment strategy will be successful
- High levels of support for extremism the more likely the U.S. will fail in containing these groups
- More support for Al Qaeda in the country- the less likely the U.S. will succeed

IV. Achieve Energy and Resource Security

- Country rating on failed state index—the higher the rating the more likely energy and resource insecurity will prevail

- Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more negative the country the less likely it is to allow Western access to energy
- Oil production in country per barrel
- Natural gas production rates

V. Insure Survival of Non-Arab Ally (Israel) in the Region

- Abrogation of treaties with Israel by Arab States endangers the Jewish State
- Country rating on failed state index—the higher the rating the more likely there will be antagonistic relations
- Country rating on Muslim-West attitudes index—the more negative a country is toward the West the more likely it is to compromise Israeli security
- Extremist versus Moderate attitudes—if extremism dominates a country's public opinion, the threat to Israel increases
- Support for Al Qaeda—the higher the level of support for Al Qaeda, the more likely the regime will be to threaten Israel's existence

By operationalizing these five goals, we will use these indicators to gauge the effect of the Arab Spring on U.S. interests with Failed State Muslim-West relations index, providing a common base of comparison for each country studied. This analysis will be buttressed and supported by qualitative evidence for the countries examined.

Definitions and Literature Review

Developing an understanding of the key definitions and literature available on the subject of the Maghreb Region and its impact, because of the Arab Spring, on US National Security policy is the key point for this research. The first definition needed for an understanding of this subject is obviously "Maghreb," which is defined as "The westernmost extent of the first Arabo-Islamic Empire, which expanded north, east and west from the

Arabian Peninsula in the century after Mohammed's death."¹⁶ There is also the necessity to understand the term "Arab Nationalism" as it plays a pivotal role in the uprisings and riots within the Maghreb. Arab Nationalism is defined as "the belief that Arabs constitute a single political community (or nation) and should have a common government."¹⁷ The driver behind this point is, and will remain, the fact that in the minds of this community there is no separation between the state and the religion. In other words "this follows the concept of the Umma, the community of believers."¹⁸ The concerns of this approach will be addressed over the course of this research. The final key definition the reader must understand is the concept of the "Arab Spring". This term is defined as "a series of anti-government uprisings in various countries in North Africa and the Middle East, beginning in Tunisia in December 2010."¹⁹ These uprisings resulted in a significant change in the governmental landscape of the Maghreb region. Understanding these definitions and concepts is a precursor to being able to understand the information presented in the various books, publications, and literary documents used to build the foundation for this research.

There is a wealth of information regarding the Maghreb region and the recent Arab Spring available both on line and in research libraries. This work focuses on two areas in the literature review to quantify the key points of the research. The first area was the Arab Spring writ large. Books here discuss the history of the Maghreb region, North Africa as a

¹⁶. Claire Spencer. *The Maghreb in the 1990s, Political and Economic Developments in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia*. Adelphi Paper 274. (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993), 5.

¹⁷. Author Goldschmidt Jr and Lawrence Davidson. *A Concise History of the Middle East, Eighth Edition*. (Colorado:Westview Press,2006), 203.

¹⁸ Robert Ehlers, Thesis advising comments, Angelo State University, Center for Security Studies, 18 May 2012.

¹⁹. Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press, 2012. Accessed 11 March 2012.

<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Arab%2BSpring>.

whole, and the colonization of the area by European countries. The second area is a more in-depth focus on the various countries that make up the Maghreb region. Along that line is a discussion of their foreign policy approach to the United States and the governmental structures in place, specifically that of Algeria. As discussed in the “History” section above, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya all experienced some level of governmental reorganization because of actions associated with the Arab Spring. The literature available and the information reviewed help us to determine potential outcomes as the new governments emerge.

CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES OF THE MAGHREB REGION

Algeria

"The states of North Africa, as well as other Arab states and many other countries in the developing world generally, share a common predicament: public contestation and the right to participate - democracy's core principles - are virtually nonexistent or at least seriously compromised"²⁰

French incursions into Algeria began in 1827 with a dispute over a 30-year-old debt. Two citizens brought this debt to the attention of the Dey (Governor) of Algeria. In the course of discussions relative to the debt the French official conducting the negotiation for his government felt slighted by the Dey and, in accordance with upholding French honor, the French King, Louis XVIII, established a naval blockade to punish the Algerians for their insult. Because the blockade did not garner the effect desired, the King ordered a more aggressive military response. This response resulted in an invasion of Algeria, a long war of conquest, and over a century of French colonial rule.

French colonization lasted from 1830 through Algerian independence in 1962. This 132-year period was marked with periods of both peace and conflict as would be expected with any colony. The main issue that drove discontent was the lack of equality afforded Algerian citizens when compared to French settlers. Much like the restrictions placed on African-Americans prior to the civil rights movement, Algerian Muslims were restricted from leaving their home areas without permission, were not allowed to assemble in public,

²⁰. John P. Entelis. "State-Society Relations-Algeria as a Case Study". *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics*, ed. Mark Tessler, Jodi Nachtwey, and Anne Banda. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), 11.

and were not afforded the right to own weapons.

The nationalistic ideals that generated the fight for independence began in the early 20th Century. Three political groups drove this fight for independence at different times. The first was generally led by Ferhat Abbas and was composed of "moderates [that] always worked within the French system and did not become outright nationalists until after the war of national liberation."²¹ The second political organization was the North African Star (ENA), which formed, initially, in 1926 as a communist organization. Algerians living in France established this organization. It only became active in Algeria proper once it had become an established organization. The ENA, led by Messali Hadj, evolved and developed over the course of time into the Algerian People's Party (PPA), which had been determined to be illegal by the Vichy government during World War II, but returned to the fore after the War as the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Societies (MTLD). The final political group was the Association of Algerian Reformists Ulama. This group was founded and led by Abd al Hamid Ben Badis and was begun in 1931. All three of these groups played a pivotal role in the emergence of Algerian Nationalism and the eventual end of French colonial rule in Algeria.

Along with the overt and covert actions of the three nationalist groups, there were two key events that had a detrimental effect on French authority during the period of colonization. The first was the defeat of the French, by the Germans, during World War II, and the subsequent liberation of the French by Allied forces. The second major blow, which really lent itself to exposing the fact that the French were not the military power they

²¹. Alf Andrew Heggoy and Robert R. Crout. *Historical Dictionary of Algeria*. "African Historical Dictionaries, No. 28. (NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1981), 12-13.

professed to be, was their defeat at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh. These two examples of a perceived weakness in both the French military and government opened the door for the more radical and unsanctioned actions of a splinter group of the PPA to spark the fires of national liberation. This splinter group, the OS (Organisation Spéciale, or Secret Organization) was made up of the younger and more radical members of the ELN, who felt the leadership was not moving quickly enough. This group maintained the focus on the insurgency by establishing the various bureaucratic organizations needed to keep the movement going. These actions eventually led to formation of a new organization, the FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale) with its military arm, the ALN (Army of National Liberation). It was the FLN that eventually developed the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) as an answer to de Gaulle's giving Algerians the option to remain a part of France or become an independent state. This "option" was, in a sense, too little too late. A point made by Alistair Horne, regarding the loss of life during the fight for independence, was "despite all of this, the tragedy of the Algerian insurgency might have been averted had the French shown 'a little more magnanimity, [and] a little more trust, moderation and compassion...'"²²

One of the key points that must be understood was the gravity of the situation, or more accurately, the death and destruction of the Algerian fight for independence (1954-1962). Along with the fact that there were over a million people killed during this eight-year conflict it also sewed the seeds of other issues. The extremely brutal urban terror campaign

²². Raymond Millen. *The Political Context behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)*. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March, 2008), 25.

conducted against the French citizens of Algeria as well as the guerilla insurgency made for very harsh conditions across the country. Added to this was an equally brutal government counter insurgency campaign. In addition to the affects felt within Algeria proper the Algerian civil war was also instrumental in removal of France's fourth republic and the ascension of De Gualle and the fifth Republic. Over time De Gualle came to see Algeria as a waste and unsalvageable. In an effort to make some headway politically he put up a referendum on inclusion or independence. The referendum resulted in a failed coup attempt in 1961 as well as Algeria choosing independence.

With the conclusion of the fight for independence, and the formation of the GPRA, Algeria set about becoming an independent nation. The National Council of the Algerian Republic (CNRA), established by the FLN, developed the Tripoli Program, which "called for land reform, the large-scale nationalization of industry and services, and a strong commitment to non-alignment and anti-colonialism in foreign relations."²³ This action set the conditions for the single-party system within Algeria and laid a foundation for the discontent that would develop the seeds for the Algerian Civil War of 1992 to 1999. In an effort to consolidate power, the GPRA attempted to remove the ALN Chief of Staff, Colonel Houari Boumediene, and in a sense remove much of the ALN's political standing. Boumediene, with Ben Bella (founder of the OS), Mohamed Khider (former member of the FLN) and Rabah Bitat, formed the Political Bureau to counter the GPRA that resulted in the announcement, on 25 September 1962, of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

"Ben Bella, Boumediene and Khider initially formed a triumvirate linking the leadership of

²³. Helen Chapin Metz, ed. *Algeria, A Country Study*. (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 56.

the three power bases - the army, the party, and the government, respectively."²⁴ This triumvirate was short-lived based on Bella's ambitions and, though he was the first President from 1963-1965, he fell victim to a military coup that placed Boumedine as President from 1965-1978. Upon Boumedine's death Bitat, then President of the People's National Assembly became the fifth President of Algeria though in reality he was but the interim President. Based on a compromise between the military and FLN, Chadli Bendjedid became the sixth President of Algeria.

The development and perpetuation of the single party state (FLN) in Algeria, with the election of Bendjedid, was simply another step toward a civil war. Bendjedid, from the beginning, was contending with political protests from university students, an ever-worsening economic situation characterized by high unemployment, as well as the increasing religious discontent with the government. Though Bendjedid saw the economic issue as dire and attempted to address the problem by dismantling the state-controlled system in favor of private control, one of the emerging threats to his government was the Islamist movement. The catalyst for the realization of this threat culminated, in 1982, with the call for a removal of the National Charter and implementation of an Islamic Government. Though not willing to give everything in to the Islamists, Bendjedid did allow the opening of an Islamic University, touted as the world's largest, in 1984 and a revision of family status law. This revision made women "wards of their families before marriage and of their husbands after marriage."²⁵

²⁴. Ibid, 57.

²⁵. Ibid, 63.

Bendjedid continued the rein of the FLN as the single party government through December of 1991. Based on election victories by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which showed overwhelmingly negative attitudes toward the FLN and its policies of the preceding 30 years, the longevity of the current regime was now in jeopardy. Though the Army initially kept to the sidelines of the discussions and discontent, so as not to repeat the violence that erupted in 1988, it eventually did "intercede" on behalf of the government, instilling martial law and arresting many of the leaders of the FIS. Eventually, elections were rescheduled in an attempt to maintain some semblance of democracy. However, the results were anticipated to be the same and, fearing a loss of power, "the army generals staged a coup d' état, sacked Chadli from the presidency, and closed down the whole democratic experiment."²⁶

Though this conflict is considered to have begun with the military coup d'état of Chadli Bendjedid, and the opening shots of rebellion in the early days after independence was gained from France, the initial spark came in October of 1988 with massive strikes and walk-outs in Algiers that spread to most major cities in Algeria. Bendjedid made attempts to quell the protests and pacify the needs of the upset citizens and, to a point, had some success, or at least enough to get him re-elected in December of 1988. However, the impetus for change was already clearly present and gaining momentum.

The Algerian Civil War of 1991-1998 showed shadows of the 1954-1962 civil war in its brutality. While the numbers killed were not as high the brutal GIA campaign wiped out entire villages and significantly weakened the Islamist insurgency. This loss of popular

²⁶. Luis Martinez, translated from French by Jonathan Derrick. *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998*. (London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1998), xiii.

support for the Islamists actions led to a further fracturing of the Islamist movement. Algeria was able to quell this Islamist revolt through a two-tiered policy of repression of radical Islamists and an outreach program to moderate and repentant Islamists through amnesty programs and the legalization of mainstream Islamist parties. However, the emergence of Preaching for Combat (GSPC) in Algeria and its association with Al Qaeda also provide examples of the pending instability, remaining a significant security threat in the Northeast Mountains and the Sahel. This security threat, the weakened economic state, and overall discontent with the government all set conditions for the actions of the Arab Spring. The result remained a tentative government victory with the current President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, affiliated with the FLN, which is the party of the military. As discussed by Isabella Mandraud in the earlier chapter, the concern continues to be the popularity of the Islamist movement. If there is true democracy in the upcoming election, Algeria may, in fact, become the next Islamist Government in the Maghreb.

Tunisia

"Of all the Arab countries, Tunisia is probably the best positioned to transition to a functioning democracy, however flawed it may be...it would seem only fitting that the country that sparked the Arab Spring became its first real success."²⁷

Tunisia represents the birthplace of the Arab Spring. The actions of Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 sparked the beginning of the "Jasmine Revolution"²⁸ (Tunisian Revolution). This served, in turn, as the catalyst for a wave of revolts across the

²⁷. Shadi Hamid. "Tunisia, Birthplace of the Revolution. *The Arab Awakening*. (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 116.

²⁸. Osama Diab. *The Jasmine Revolution*. World Press.org. Accessed 19 March 2012.
<http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/3686.cfm>.

Maghreb, and the greater Middle East, called the Arab Spring.

The French colonization of Algeria served as a starting point for designs on the greater North African region. Though not initially overt with their intentions, the French made incremental inroads into Tunisia in the form of financial dependence. In addition to the success, through the French consul, of the removal of the Tunisian Constitution (officially removed in 1864), “they convinced Tunisia’s ruler, Muhammed Bey, to create an International Financial Commission to control state expenditures...it decreased Tunisia’s financial independence and made it more reliant on other countries, particularly France.”²⁹ In an effort to appease France for its territorial and other losses to Germany during the Franco-Prussian War, the German government accepted France's intention to occupy Tunisia without argument and, in 1884, Tunisia became a protectorate of France.

Tunisia’s colonization occurred through a combination of European power politics and French "slight of hand". The establishment of the protectorate came in large part out of an agreement with the British that the French would not challenge their interest in Cyprus. However, the Italians still claimed to have some interest in Tunisia, which France summarily ended with a claimed response to Tunisian incursions into Algeria. Seeing the force that was closing on Tunis, the Tunisian Bey (leader of Tunisia and member of the Husainid Dynasty) opted to make a deal with the French, which resulted in the Treaty of Bardo. It guaranteed French protection of Tunisia but also prevented any expansionist plans the Bey might have.

Though French colonization brought significant monetary and status improvements to

²⁹ . Alison Tarwater. *French Colonization in the Maghreb: A Central Influence in Both Regions Today*. Accessed 20 March 2012.
http://www.howardcc.edu/academics/academic_divisions/english/instructional/pdf/French_Colonization_in_the_Maghreb.pdf.

Tunisia, it also shaped the conditions for the eventual revolts leading to Tunisian independence. One of the key groups initiating this push for independence started out as the Young Tunisian Party. Formed in 1908, "they were a small group, interested in efficiency rather than representative government...[convinced] that the Tunisian elite was capable of taking over a greater share of responsibility..."³⁰ This party fractured due to a perceived lack of action in 1920 with the formation of the Destour (Constitution) Party. This group made strides and had the support of the Tunisian leadership but, as with many movements for change, elements of the group were not satisfied with the speed of the change.

This new element was called the Neo-Destour Party. Made up of younger members of the Destour Party, they claimed that "nationalism, to be effective against the French, had to break loose from its traditional power base among the urban elite and mobilize mass support."³¹ Because of the Neo-Destour Party's more radical stance on independence, the French outlawed it soon after its formation and its leadership, including Habib Bourguiba, was imprisoned. However, with the election in 1936 of Léon Blum and the Popular Front in France, the Neo-Destour Party's power increased significantly. In addition to Blum's approach, which was much more liberal than that of his predecessors, he also released the leadership of the Neo-Destour Party and invited them to discuss their issues. In making his case to the French government, Bourguiba "specified as priorities the termination of arrangements advantaging French citizens in Tunisia, such as 'official' colonization and the

³⁰. Harold D. Nelson, ed. *Tunisia, A Country Study*. (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 39.

³¹. Ibid, 42.

'colonial third,' along with the installation of a constitutional government."³² Though the Popular Front's time in power was short-lived it provided significant opportunity for the Neo-Destour Party to grow its numbers and spread its message, again, fueling the fire of independence from France.

This continued push for independence in the interwar period continued to make France nervous. With the various actions that led to World War II and the French defeat in 1940, many French questioned the "loyalty" of the Tunisian people. In an effort to appease these fears members of the Tunisian government, which was itself in protectorate status and thus largely powerless, attempted to trade loyalty for increased rights for Tunisian citizens. With the French refusal to recognize these rights, and their arrest of leaders within the Neo-Destour party being arrested, the latter organized a protest in Tunis on 9 April 1938. Though the numbers of casualties vary depending on whether it is a French or Tunisian report, the fact remains that there was significant bloodshed. The Neo-Destour broadcast the fact that the French perpetrated the violence on innocent protestors. However, based on the memoirs of one of Bourguiba close allies, "Bourguiba told him just before the disturbances that to achieve the party's objectives 'it was necessary for blood to flow'."³³ From this point through the beginning of World War II the Neo-Destour could gain little ground against the French or against the original Destour Party. With the exception of warning those in power to be wary of alliances with either side given the impending war, the Neo-Destour Party remained somewhat silent.

³². Kenneth Perkins. *A History of Modern Tunisia*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 97.

³³. Ibid, 102.

In the post-war period, Bourguiba realized that there was little chance of success for independence without significant support from within Tunisia and, somewhat more importantly, pressure from the international arena. He and other leaders of the nationalist movement made in-roads to the newly organized League of Arab States, formed the Bureau d'Information du Neo-Destour and also joined Moroccan and Algerian nationalists in forming the Bureau du Maghreb Arabe (1947). Unfortunately, none of this assisted substantively in ending French rule. One of the main detractors from Maghreb independence collectively, of which Tunisia represented one piece, was the subject of the Jewish State and Palestine. Next to the brewing conflict there, North Africa's political problems were a distant second. The next decade was marked by an increase in actions geared toward achieving independence from France but with little success until, "in June of 1954 a socialist premier, Pierre Mendes-France, comes to power in Paris and introduces a new policy of partial French withdrawal from two of the nation's most troubled colonies, Tunisia and Indochina."³⁴

Due in large part to the direction and policies of Pierre Mendes-France, in July of 1957 the old governing body of the bey and the Husainid Dynasty were removed and a new government was formed. Based on his leadership of the Neo-Destour, which had formed the new government in consultation with the bey, Bourguiba became the Head of State as well as the premier in Tunisia. This set the conditions for the single party system (New Destour/Constitutional Democratic Assembly {RCD}) that ruled Tunisia from 1957 through 2010.

There were, however, key elements developed over the course of Bourguiba's rule

34. History World. *History of Tunisia*. Accessed 20 March 2012.
<http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ac93>.

that solidified this system. The first, which was facilitated by a French attack of Algerian rebel forces based inside Tunisia, dealt with the new constitution. The Constituent Assembly (Tunisia's legislative body) was responsible for drafting the constitution for the new Tunisian government. The completion of this draft coincided with the French attacks, which interrupted the discussions of some of the key points, namely the discussion of executive and legislative powers. When the crisis with the French attacks ended and the discussion resumed, "the most striking feature [of the new constitution] was the strong position accorded the president of the republic."³⁵

The next major issue solidifying the single party system occurred in 1975. Though there were questions regarding Bourguiba's health, including many in the government thinking he was close to death upon his return from getting health care outside of Tunisia, he was elected in November of 1974 to his fourth term as President. The following May, the National Assembly unanimously approved a constitutional amendment naming him president for life."³⁶

The final issue that brings to light the single party system was the removal of Bourguiba in 1987 by his Prime Minister Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. Though Bourguiba had been designated "President for Life" by a constitutional amendment there were those in both Tunisian politics as well as citizens who expected open elections upon the death of Bouguiba. When Prime Minister Ben Ali removed him, based on increasingly unpredictable actions as Head of State, and then stepped in as President, there was some level of shock

³⁵. Nelson. *Tunisia, A Country Study*, 53.

³⁶. Ibid, 63.

among many in Tunisia. In true "dictatorial" fashion Ben Ali set about establishing himself and his supporters. Many of the former president's supporters, at the very least, were ostracized from political participation with the most vocal jailed. In addition, Ben Ali made it known that there would be no "disentangling of the thoroughly interwoven lines between the state and party."³⁷ This further solidified him and his party as the ruling regime in Tunisia, a regime that would last until January 2011.

Morocco

“Morocco’s resources and talents, many of them still unexploited, offer exciting possibilities for the future, and there is every reason to expect that this country, which was one of the first friends of the United States, will continue to be a steadfast one.”³⁸

The Alawite Dynasty has dominated modern history in Morocco, beginning in the mid-15th Century with Mulay Rashid up to the present King Mohammed VI. As the quote above suggests, Morocco’s relationship with the United States has been steady despite the turmoil that has occurred across the Maghreb over time. To that end, Morocco was able to weather the actions of the Arab Spring much better than its fellow Maghreb countries through savvy political actions by the King, which provide more opportunity, from a political perspective, for religious groups and parties. It remains to be seen, however, if the changes put in place will mitigate the economic disparity between the elite and common citizen, and thus the level of dissatisfaction amongst the populace.

The colonization of Morocco became a point of interest among Europeans at a similar

³⁷. Perkins. *A History of Modern Tunisia*, 185.

³⁸. Charles F. Gallagher. *The United States and North Africa; Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia*. (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), 246.

time as other nations in the Maghreb. At any given time there were colonial aspirations by the Spanish and French, as well as a medium of control sought by the Turks based on a common culture and language. For the most part the common subject and the elite of Morocco had little interest in European trade or politics. Even the events that led to the colonization of Algeria by the French and the defeat, by the French, of a Moroccan army force, did little to affect the general population of Morocco. In fact, it was “the war of 1859-1860 between Spain and Morocco [that] has been seen by historians of the period as one of the watersheds of nineteenth-century Moroccan history.”³⁹ This war gave the elites, specifically, the first real indication of the sub-standard condition of the Moroccan Army. This realization impacted significantly how they would approach future relationships outside their own borders. Three key points of tension between the “potential” colonial powers and the Moroccan leadership grew out of this realization: “the status of protégés, commercial privileges, and frontier incidents between Moroccan tribesmen and French and Spanish troops.”⁴⁰ In examining the “modus operandi” of many colonial powers, it is clear that they used some perceived threat, in this case Moroccan tribesmen, as a pretext for war and eventual colonization. Given the disastrous results of the Moroccan-Spanish War, any confrontation with the French or Spanish was somewhat less than desirable. Commercial privileges were another “inroad” used by colonial powers—privileges that the Moroccan government afforded to some, but not all, foreign merchants living and working in Morocco. The final point of tension was the protégés. These were Moroccan nationals hired by foreign

³⁹. Edmund Burke, III. *Prelude to Protectorates in Morocco; Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 20.

⁴⁰. Ibid, 26.

merchants to provide them additional advantages with citizens outside the urban areas. Having a local face associated with the goods and services gave these merchants better opportunities to profit from trade across a broad spectrum of the populace. To a point we continue to practice similar methods both militarily and diplomatically. The protégés became their own “class” in between the local bourgeois and common citizens, making the political landscape even more convoluted.

The final adjudication on Morocco’s colonial status came as a result of a conference held in 1906 in Algeiras. The conference was necessitated by the perception by France and Spain of German interest in Morocco. At the conference, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, all participants agreed to the independence of Morocco under the current Alawite Dynasty. What was not stated, though clearly understood by all, was the significant influence France would have in any of Morocco’s dealings outside its own borders. This represented the first step to an acceptance of de facto, if not de jure, French colonization. With the French playing such a pivotal role in the international status of Morocco, to include incursions by any other foreign power such as Germany’s in 1911, the result was an increased French military presence. Though the incident in 1911 was settled peaceably it did bring to the Sultan the realization of the lack of power he actually had to protect his country. In 1912 the Sultan (Hafid) signed the Treaty of Fès, effectively making Morocco a French protectorate and ceding his country to French and Spanish colonial aspirations. Though this almost immediately met with resistance, it was not until 1955 that positive steps were taken to solidify Moroccan independence and restore the pre-colonial monarchy.

Based significantly on unrest in Algeria in 1955, the French began to give credence to

the idea of Moroccan independence. Sultan Mohammed V, exiled in 1953 by the French, returned and successfully completed the negotiations with France for Moroccan independence, which was formalized in 1957. It was also at this time that Mohammed V, who made it clear he was working to transform Morocco into a constitutional monarchy, changed his title from Sultan to King of Morocco. Though the King made the claim of a constitutional monarchy, the actual constitution was postponed until 1962. And though elections occurred, the King became the Prime Minister and appointed his son as the Deputy, again solidifying the monarchy's control of the government. Unfortunately the King died in 1961 and his son acceded to the throne. Under King Hassan's II rule, the first constitution was signed in 1963. The King professed his support for a multi-party system of government but also worked to ensure his position was strengthened and the monarchy would endure. The protests resulting from the King's poor human-rights record, and the economic disparity between the elite and common citizen, resulted in at least two assassination attempts one in 1971 and another in 1972. However, in both cases, the King survived and strengthened his position even further. King Hassan II's priority while in power was centered on land disputes with other countries of the Maghreb and North Africa in general as well as building relationships with the West, and the United States specifically. Over the course of his forty-year reign he became a steadfast ally of the United States in its dealings with other Middle East countries as well as a significant, though somewhat silent, partner in the Arab/Israeli problem. Upon his death in 1999 his son King Mohammed VI succeeded him. The new King inherited the same economic disparity problem the plagued his father, but the absolute loyalty of the people of Morocco, to both him and Hassan II, stemmed any significant unrest

or revolts.

King Mohammed VI, though, continued to be very harsh toward any Islamist group challenging his authority. The Casablanca attacks, conducted by GSPC, were meant to affect Spanish and British interest in Morocco. The resultant actions by King Mohammed VI were extremely harsh. That said, with the actions of the Arab Spring, King Mohammed VI's amendments to the constitution and more open dealings with opposition parties helped him to avoid the fate of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Ben Ali in Tunisia. While Morocco has had a reputation of putting down Islamists' attempts to integrate into the government, there has been a more open approach, as of late, to be more inclusive. It remains to be seen, as was discussed with Algeria, if the changes put in place will be enduring or simply placate the population for a period of time before the next incident of discontent.

Libya

“The history of Libya represents, even by Middle Eastern standards, an extraordinary odyssey: from Ottoman backwater to Italian colony, from conservative monarchy to revolutionary regime; from rags to riches; and from brinkmanship to a grudging and still unfolding statesmanship.”⁴¹

In the mid 19th and early 20th Century Libya saw a combination of Italian and Sanusi control across its countryside. With the ongoing actions in both Algeria and Tunisia by the French and the British operations in Egypt, Italy began to build its case for the colonization of Libya. “A rapprochement politique with France, promising an Italian hands-off policy with Tunisia in return for a French equivalent regarding Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fazzan,

⁴¹. Dirk Vandewalle. *A History of Modern Libya*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.

removed one major obstacle.”⁴² This time period was also marked by an increase in the religious teachings and leadership of Muhammad ibn Ali as Sanusi, founder of the Sanusi religious order.

Italy saw a colonial opportunity in Libya, at the time of the French colonization of Tunisia and the British actions in Egypt, as the last opportunity to embark on an Italian colonial experience. Many of the early actions were facilitated by secret agreements with France, which allowed the Italians to concentrate on Libya and other issues without a concern for France expanding east out of Tunisia. This removal of the French from the colonization equation, however, did not mitigate the issues and problems resident within Libya as the Italians began their advance.

Initially, Italy claimed sovereignty over Libya based on the Treaty of Ouchy signed in October of 1912. The problem with this claim was that it was ambiguous enough to allow the same impression of sovereignty to be held by the Ottomans. In addition it was so poorly written that the loyalties to the Sultan were still recognized by all citizens. The sum total of Italian control, though on paper representing the whole of Libya, was mere miles outside the major cities of Tripoli, Benghazi, Denra, and Tubruq. The year 1913 marked the point at which Italian military forces began their conquest of Libya in earnest.

The three regions of Libya (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fazzan) required varied approaches from the Italian forces. Tripolitania was less inclined to riots or fighting against the Italians due to a strong desire, by at least the elites of the region, to maintain their positions of economic and societal prominence. Cyrenaica had a much different attitude.

⁴². Ibid, 21.

The terrain, for example, was much more difficult as opposed to Tripolitania's wide-open spaces. In addition there was a greater Sanusi presence in Cyrenaica that contributed to the resistance effort across Libya and Cyrenaica specifically. However, because of the lack of a concerted resistance movement "it was almost by default that the struggle against the Italians, particularly in Cyrenaica, would be fought by a religious Islamic order that relied overwhelmingly on tribal support."⁴³ In examining the third region of Libya, Fazzan, there was the increased concern of French incursion into the area, despite the agreement between the two countries. Italy was concerned enough about it that it diverted forces from fighting tribal resistance, causing a significant loss of control across all fronts. The Italians were again relegated to controlling only the coastal cities of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica with the balance of the country controlled by tribal leaders and the Sanusi order.

Italian involvement on the Allied side during the First World War, and a consequent neglect of issues in Libya, prompted the first solid signs of a rise in Arab Nationalism in Libya. Two of the key developments coming out of the First World War were the rising power of the Sanusi Order, and the competing claims to sovereignty over Libya granted Italy from the Pact of London in April of 1915.

The rising power of the Sanusi Order was a direct result of the Ottoman pressure on the Sanusi leadership to attack British forces. The leader at the time, Ahmad al-Shariff, stepped down and handed the leadership responsibilities of the Sanusi Order to Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi, who was the grandson of the Order's founder. Idris "opposed the campaign against the British. He brought about a rapprochement with them, creating a tacit alliance that would

⁴³. Ibid, 26.

last for half a century. This also gave the Sanusi Order *de facto* diplomatic status.”⁴⁴ The result of this ability to conduct diplomatic negotiations on the part of citizens of Cyrenaica enabled the Akrama Agreement. This agreement, between Italy and Cyrenaica and mediated by the British, gave the Sanusi Order control of the entire region with the exception of the coastal areas.

Though this agreement significantly increased the power of the people of Libya in Cyrenaica, it did relatively little for relations between the three regions of the country. Idris ended up going into exile based on his lack of confidence in any negotiation with the Italians, an opinion that hardened with Mussolini’s accession to power. With the departure of Idris and the continued decline of inter-regional cooperation, any legitimate resistance to Italian colonization efforts was relegated to the areas where the Sanusi still held some power over the tribal leaders.

The resistance got a needed jolt with the ascension of Sayyid Umar al-Mukhtar to the leadership of the Sanusi Order. Sayyid Umar al-Mukhtar had supported Ahmad al-Shariff and spent time in exile with Idris. In 1923 he returned from Cairo and “for nearly eight years he led bands of Bedouin guerrillas in an increasingly bitter and unequal war against fascist Italy.”⁴⁵ This eight-year campaign against the Italian forces led to the forced re-location of Libyan citizens into concentration camps. The estimated deaths as a result of these subjugation efforts by the Italian forces range between 250,000 to 300,000. Though this number is an estimate of the time period from 1912 to 1943, the bulk of these deaths are

⁴⁴. Ibid, 27.

⁴⁵. Ibid, 31.

assumed to have occurred while the fascists were in control of Italy. The conclusion of the Second World War brought with it significant discussions on the future of Libya. The four powers (US, Britain, France, Soviet Union) agreed that Italy would have to relinquish any colonial power over Libya. However, it wasn't until 1951 that all the diplomatic squabbling was finalized and Libya became an independent country.

Based on the years of negotiation between the Four Powers, as well as input from the United Nations, Libya became independent in 1951. However, "the United Kingdom of Libya was an accidental state: created by, and at the behest of, Great Power interests and agreed to by the local provinces who feared other alternatives."⁴⁶ The timing of this independence was right at the beginning of the Cold War. Libya represented a strategic location along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea that the West could ill afford to have controlled by the Soviet Union.

The new monarchy of Libya was based on the Sanusi Order and its first king was Idris I (Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi), the grandson of the founder of the Sanusi Order. This selection made sense based on Idris' tireless work toward the cause of independence and his negotiation efforts with world powers for the same. Upon ascension to the throne the federal monarchy designated the King as Chief of State, a post that included hereditary succession. In addition, the development of governmental organizations also ensured that significant power resided with the King, to include the fact that many senior posts within the government were in fact appointed by the King. The key elements of Libya's political progress centered on the fact that after the first election all political parties were outlawed,

⁴⁶. Ibid, 40.

which included the deportation of the National Congress Party leader. Confusion continued between federal and provincial authority, with the emphasis on provincial loyalty the preferable of the two. The final element that shaped the Libyan politics was the absence of a child as heir to the throne. King Idris I initially appointed his brother to be next in line. However, his brother was sixty-three at the time of this decision and died prior to King Idris I. The King then selected his nephew, Prince Hasan ar Rida, to be his heir.

The monarchy maintained a very pro-Western attitude. Over the course of the first years, King Idris I signed military alliance agreements with both Great Britain and the United States. These agreements gave the United States basing rights in Libya, which proved to be strategic locations in the context of the Cold War. The agreements also provided bombing ranges in the arid areas of Libya where aircraft, based both in Libya and Europe, could conduct training. The diplomatic ties did not end with the US and Britain as Libya also built strong relationships with France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

The major boost in Libyan status, from an oil-producing nation standpoint, came in June of 1959. Exxon (then called Esso) discovered major petroleum reserves in areas of Libya. This discovery and subsequent development over the course of the late 1950s and early 1960s created significant wealth in some areas of the country but also significant decline, particularly in agriculture, in others. Though this did not create any destabilization in the government, the seeds of discontent were being sown regarding the form of government Libyans thought best for their country. Prime Minister Muhi ad Din Fakini, based on his determination that the current governmental process had become burdensome and unproductive, “secured adoption by parliament of a bill, endorsed by the King, that

abolished the federal form of government, establishing in its place a unitary monarchical state with a dominant central government.”⁴⁷ This move, with the support of the King, began to solidify the initial seeds of rebellion by further increasing the imbalance between the population and the leadership, and between the provinces and the central government.

These seeds of discontent bore fruit on 1 September 1969, when the Free Officers Movement conducted a coup d'état. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a part of the Free Officers Movement represented by twelve members, declared the Libyan Arab Republic on the same day, stating “with the help of God, in the path of freedom, unity, and social justice, guaranteeing the right of equality to its citizens, and opening before them the doors of honorable work.”⁴⁸ The promised move toward equality, though, was short-lived.

The RCC, governing body of the Libyan Arab Republic, outlawed the Sanusi Order. In addition all political parties were forbidden save the Arab Socialist Union. Many of the former leaders of Libya, to include the Royal Family, were tried for treason and imprisoned. Those not in the country (many went into exile during the coup) were tried in absentia. Though professed to be a government with no single leader, Gaddafi's charismatic approach to leadership quickly made him, in the eyes of the world, the dictator in Libya.

The United States was deeply concerned with Libyan actions in the response to its shrinking presence in the country. To the United States it showed a deteriorating relationship with between Libya and the U.S. as well as the West in general. An example of this is the national holiday that was designated on the same day that the US airbase in Libya was

⁴⁷. Helen Chapin Metz, ed. *Libya A Country Study*. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), 40.

⁴⁸. Ibid, 42.

returned to Libyan control. In addition to this deteriorating relationship with the West, increased ties between Libya and the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations made matters worse. The major emphasis behind the US and British backing the establishment of Libyan independence and support of the monarchy was the strategic advantage Libya provided in the United States' Cold War politics, and that advantage had now become a liability.

Libya's reputation with Western nations continued to decline during the 1970s and 1980s. Accusations of sponsoring terrorism were prevalent in the 1970s to such an extent that in 1977 the Defense Department added Libya to the list of enemies of the United States, followed in 1979 by the State Department's addition of Libya to its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Gaddafi's emphasis on Arab Unity was also a highlight of the 1970s.

In the 1990s there was an attempt to oust Gaddafi by the Libyan Islamic Combat Group (LICG). The government put down the attempt and increased its crackdown on Islamist groups countrywide, but specifically in the Eastern area of the country where the Islamists maintained a greater stronghold. The theme of Islamist resurgence also played a part in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

"Although all Arab governments endorsed the idea in principle, most observed that conditions were not right for putting it into practice or that unity would come only at the end of a long process of historical evolution...[Gaddafi believed] Arab unity was not an ideal but a realistic goal."⁴⁹ His continued push to unite the Arab nations included membership in the Federation of Arab Republics, which included Egypt and Syria. The concept, while sound in

⁴⁹. Ibid, 52.

some respects for providing a unified front for Arab unity, quickly fell to the side due to disagreements between Libya and Egypt, and between Egypt and Syria. Not the least of the obstacles to establishing a full union between the two countries was the difference in governmental structure. Egypt was much more open and democratic than Libya as well as having a secular government and culture rather than an Islamist or theocratic one.

Relations between the US and Libya remained strained until Libya began to open the door to discussions on the prosecution of those responsible for the downing of Pan Am Flight 104 over Lockerbie Scotland. In 1998 Libya agreed that the two main defendants could be tried in a neutral country. The next significant move in warming relations with the West came in December of 2003 when Gaddafi announced that he would no longer attempt to procure or produce Weapons of Mass Destruction, in large part a result of seeing what happened to Iraq. Gaddafi continued to work with the United States in an effort to increase his standing in the international arena. Though not an ally to the United States, he was no longer the threat he once posed.

Actions on the part of the Libyan government from 1998 through 2010 were executed in a veiled attempt at few restrictions on both its population, and in its attitude toward the world outside its borders. Unfortunately, the regime's reputation for human rights violations, the absolute authority of Gaddafi over all functions of the government and country, and the lack of trust within the population were the driving forces behind the Arab Spring outcome in Libya. The absolute authority, and resultant lack of trust of the population, were conditions set by Gaddafi's destruction of all major government organizations. The ability to establish a functioning state, in the aftermath of the Gaddafi regime, is further hampered by the freedom

of movement enjoyed by Islamists and AQIM elements that is a result of Gaddafi's actions. The question now becomes one of determining what these Arab Spring experiences mean, individually and collectively, for US National Security Policy formation within the Maghreb region, specifically as it addresses Libya.

The Maghreb region has gone through significant changes over the course of its history. Colonial rule by France and Italy, wars of independence in the mid-1950s across the region and sporadic civil unrest have shaped the recent Arab Spring uprisings across the Arab world but specifically within the borders of the Maghreb region. The volatile nature of the Maghreb can be attributed to many things. However, the incursion of AQIM in Algeria and northern Mali, the unchecked arms trade as a result of the collapse of the Libyan government, and the rise of Islamist power are pivotal aspects of this unrest. These various contributory issues will be addressed in more detail in the following chapter, which deals with the range of issues bearing on this important problem.

CHAPTER IV

ISSUES BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

“The wave of democracy that transformed governance in most of Latin America and East Asia in the 1980s and Eastern Europe and much of Central Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has barely reached the Arab States. This freedom deficit undermines human development and is one of the most painful manifestations of lagging political development.”⁵⁰

This chapter begins the analysis of past and current issues in the Maghreb region, the intent being to extrapolate explanations for why the Arab Spring occurred and to what extent the actions will impact the development of US National Security Policy in the future.

Compiling the necessary data proved somewhat daunting in that there has been a significant amount of work written on the Arab Spring. Even so, much of the analysis is still pending.

As an example, the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index covers the period 1 January through 31 December 2011.

In an effort to examine as much information as possible, this researcher used a variety of sources to quantify what effect the Arab Spring will have on the development of US National Security Policy. The first source is the Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, 2011. “The Failed State Index is an annual ranking of 177 nations based on their levels of stability and pressures they face.”⁵¹ The next source was out of the Foreign Policy Research Institute and authored by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman. Maddy-Weitzman penned “North Africa’s

⁵⁰. James L. Gelvin. *The Arab Uprising, What Everyone Needs to Know*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Kindle Fire location 217 of 3412.

⁵¹. Fund for Peace. *The Failed States Index 2011*. Accessed 15 Mar 2012.
<http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011>.

Democratic Prospects,” which analyzes a host of questions relevant to North Africa’s potential for a democratic future. In addition, information from *The Economist*, titled “Political Instability Index: Vulnerability to Social and Political Unrest,” provided information relevant to the political, social, and economic factors that give insight into the level of instability within a given state. Information available on *The Economist* website also provided a 2010 view of unrest within the member states of the Arab League.

The Failed States Index provides insight into the conditions of the various countries across the Maghreb and their relative positions during the 2011 timeframe. The one shortfall regarding the Maghreb is that, with the exception of Tunisia, many of the resultant actions associated with the Arab Spring fell outside of the latest index. This information is valuable from the standpoint of understanding some of the underlying problems that were contributory to the eventual outcomes, by country, of the Arab Spring.

The framework for this discussion will be the same for all the countries studied. The countries will be examined from the point of view of the five strategic objectives. The final chapter will assess the Maghreb writ large against the three scenarios, make specific observations, and provide recommendations regarding the future of the Maghreb’s specific countries. The main sources for this data, in addition to those addressed above, are the Country Rating on Muslim-West Perspectives Index, extremist versus moderate attitudes in Country, and the level of Support for Al Qaeda in the particular country.

Algeria

The Failed State Index places Algeria at number 81 out of the 177 countries evaluated. As mentioned, this Index for 2011 does not include much of the information from

the results of the Arab Spring. The available data, though, do offer insights into how the various countries of the Maghreb are viewed. In the case of Algeria, one of the key actions that caused it to move up the chart dealt with its actions against regional terrorist groups.

Algeria's record on combating terrorist activities is in direct support of one of the strategic objectives being analyzed: "Prevent Terrorist Sanctuary". The country's emphasis on combating terrorist groups within its borders is significant in that it places itself in a positive light with Western governments, especially the United States, as the fight against terrorism continues. When we examine the second operational task, "Keep Arab Allies of U.S in Power," Algeria represents a potential positive point for the United States. Though the country was not immune from the effects of Arab Spring protests, as well as the emboldening of protestors after the resignation of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, the Algerian government remains intact. In addition, from an informational perspective, the President has also announced the removal of emergency state policies in place since 1992. What this means, from a strategic objectives perspective, is that the Pro-American Algerian government, for the moment, remains in power. The concern is for how long. Examining the metrics established in the Failed States Index, in particular information provided in the Muslim-West attitudes index, and then looking at how moderate or extreme the population is, or will be, provides key data points for consideration. "Algeria is caught between its fear of returning to chaos and violence if the army and regime loosen up its underlying socioeconomic difficulties that cry out for political and economic reform."⁵² The metric for Algeria moving up on the Failed States Index (a positive move) was its combating of terrorist

⁵². Bruce O. Riedel. *Algeria, Whistling Past the Graveyard*. The Arab Awakening. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 210.

organizations. This, in turn, has an indirect effect on the third operational task to “Contain and Diminish Anti-American Regimes and Groups.” Algeria’s continued work toward both preventing terrorist sanctuary and keeping anti-American groups at bay will assist in securing a positive relationship with the United States.

However, the one area of concern, from a terrorist perspective, is the activities of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). Algerian forces have achieved significant headway against AQIM. The group has been relegated to the remote Sahel region and the Northeastern Mountains. However, AQIM still maintains the ability to attack Algerian security forces on some level. In addition, the alliance between AQIM and the Tuareg Rebels that have established their own area in Northern Mali is a cause for concern, especially since the recent coup in Mali has given the Tuareg and their AQIM allies’ sanctuary over a huge area. The main concern, beyond the various attacks, is the capability that AQIM has to establish terror camps and execute criminal activity and kidnappings to support their operations. As elections in Algeria go forward, with the predicted strong Islamist success, the concern remains the impact this change in focus will have on the stability of the country as well as its




Fig 1

relationship with the West.

From the perspective of the “Achieve Energy and Resource Security” operational task, the Failed States Index rating of 81 is a definite positive position. There are also data

that show how well Algeria is doing across a host of energy and resource elements. These

data were obtained from Index Mundi and covers a variety of energy statistics. Figure 1⁵³, dealing with crude oil production and consumption, is but one example of where Algeria is leading the Maghreb and yet another indicator of the country's energy and resource security. "It is important to note that the Algerian republic, too, has been blessed with oil wellsprings, which its military-dominated regime has used to also ramp up spending on jobs, housing, and infrastructure."⁵⁴ According to the Energy Information Administration, Algeria was only behind Nigeria, Angola, and Libya in crude oil production in 2010 within the African continent. "Algeria produced an estimated average of 1.27 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil in 2011, about the same as it produced in 2010."⁵⁵ However, they were first, across the Maghreb, in overall energy production.⁵⁶ The International Energy Agency also publishes the "Key World Energy Statistics," which tracks producers, exporters, and importers of various energy products. Under the "Producers, Net Exporters, and Net Importers of Oil Products" section Algeria was among the top ten exporters in 2009 (see figure 2)⁵⁷. The associated energy security that comes with this is also

Net exporters	Mt
Russian Federation	102
Saudi Arabia	50
India	36
Venezuela	33
Kuwait	28
United States	19
Algeria	16
Belarus	13
Korea	13
Italy	12
Others	139
Total*	461

2009 data

Fig 2

⁵³. Indexmundi. *Algerian Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 25 Apr 2012.

<http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.

⁵⁴. Sean L. Yom. *Understanding the Resilience of Monarchy During the Arab Spring*. Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes. Accessed 22 Apr 2012. <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.yom.monarchy-arab-spring.html>.

⁵⁵. Energy Information Administration. *Algeria*. Country Analysis Briefs. Accessed 22 Apr 2012. <http://205.254.135.7/EMEU/cabs/Algeria/pdf.pdf>.

⁵⁶. The International Energy Agency. *Key World Energy Statistics*. (France: Soregraph, 2011), 48.

⁵⁷. Ibid, 21.

a positive aspect of Algeria's relationship with the United States as it shows an ability to contribute to global energy and resource issues as well as an imperative to maintain security within the country.

The available information regarding the Algerian record with regard to Israel is one of the few negatives in the analysis of Algeria. "Algeria's reluctance to mend fences with Israel was a consequence of several factors: Algeria's colonial legacy; the Franco-Israeli collaboration during 1954-1962, when Algeria fought for its independence; and the ascendancy of militant Islamic parties in that country."⁵⁸

Algeria remains a question mark at best regarding its relationship to U.S. National Security interests. How the new government implements changes, conducts elections, and provides transparency and inclusion will be tell tale signs of its willingness to be included in the community of nations. Either way Algeria is one country in the strategic importance of the Maghreb region and will, therefore, play a role in how the United States approaches the region.

Tunisia

The Failed State Index places Tunisia at 108 of 177 countries evaluated. As discussed earlier, of the countries of the Maghreb, Tunisia was the only one that has information reflected in the current Failed States Index because there were Arab Spring actions occurring within the observation period. The key action was Mohamed Bouazizi setting himself ablaze in protest of his treatment by a Tunis police officer. However, the picture is more positive regarding the state's efforts against terrorism.

⁵⁸. Jacob Abadi. *Algeria's Policy Toward Israel: Pragmatism and Rhetoric*. The Middle East Journal, Vol 56, Autumn 2002. (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 2002), 616-617.

According to the Department of State, “The Government of Tunisia placed a high priority on countering terrorism, using tight border and internal security controls to deter the formation of terrorist groups and block any potential for terrorist actions; social programs to reduce the impact of high unemployment and help prevent radicalization; and prosecution to punish potential terrorists.”⁵⁹ Reports from the American Embassy in Tunis support the fact that Tunisia is a player in the prevention of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries. What remains to be seen is how that will fare with the developing government that took over upon the exile of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. For the moment, though, between the Failed States Index, Muslim-West Attitudes Index, and extremist versus moderate views it is somewhat apparent that Tunisia is fighting against terrorists using the country as a sanctuary. One of the unknowns that will hopefully become evident in the coming months as the new government establishes its authority, will be the level of power of the Islamists have and how they will use it. A positive sign hit the news in November of 2011: “Tunisia’s Islamist-led government will focus on democracy, human rights and a free-market economy in planned changes to the constitution, effectively leaving religion out of the text it will draw up.”⁶⁰ This discussion of terrorist sanctuary provides an excellent transition into the second operational task involving maintaining Arab allies. The other contributory factor that must be understood is the Salafist rise with the new Islamist role in government. While the Islamists have developed an approach that forms a coalition with the secular side of

⁵⁹. Department of State. *Tunisia*. Country Reports on Terrorism, 2010. Accessed 22 Apr 2012. <http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/resources/from-washington/2010-country-reports-on-terrorism.html>.

⁶⁰. Tom Heneghan. *Tunisia’s Islamist-led Government Rejects Laws to Enforce Religion*. Al Arabiya News. Accessed 22 Apr 2012. <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/05/175612.html>.

government, the Salafists, who have gained prominence in the rural areas of the country, are engendering a great deal of controversy in a country that is the most secular of Arab states.

Tunisia, under Ben Ali, had a relatively cordial relationship with the United States. Ben Ali was seen as a moderator in Arab-US relations and championed many initiatives, not the least of which was the United Nations Solidarity Fund, which focused on eradicating poverty, increasing positive associations with him and his government. With the exile of Ben Ali and the election of a majority Islamist government, time will tell if Tunisia remains an Arab ally of the United States.

In 2009, The International Energy Agency put Tunisia third within the Maghreb in energy production. However, unlike Algeria, where production has consistently outpaced consumption, Tunisia's crude oil production-to-consumption ratio became negative between 1998 and




Fig 3

1999 (see Fig. 3)⁶¹. The picture this paints of Tunisia is a county that will consistently require imports of its energy requirements. In comparison to the other countries of the Maghreb it makes Tunisia the least energy-secure country in the Maghreb.

Based on the past actions of the government of Tunisia, both under Ben Ali and his predecessor, there is questionable support for the fifth operational task to “Insure the Survival

⁶¹. Indexamundi. *Tunisian Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 25 Apr 2012. <http://www.indexamundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.

of Non-Arab (Israel) Ally in the Region”. Though considered a US ally, Tunisia has played a major role in the Israeli/Palestinian problem. From 1982 through 1993 Tunisia was the home of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with its headquarters on the outskirts of Tunis. Though the decision to allow the PLO to set up within the borders of Tunisia was made before Ben Ali removed his predecessor it nonetheless represents one of the areas in which the United States has criticized the government of Tunisia. Even after the PLO’s departure from Tunisia, the relationship between Tunisia and the new Palestinian Authority remained one of friendship and alliance, again bringing into question the ability to support any initiative securing the survival of Israel.

How the new Tunisian government approaches the subject of the Israeli/Palestinian problem will be a telling sign as to how the U.S. will approach relations with the emerging government. A heavy Islamist presence in government, if approached as discussed thus far, could be seen as a positive in that there is not a significant drive toward implementation of Shari’a Law as is the case with most Islamist groups. This initiative opens the door for dialogue on the question of Israel and Palestine. However, if the Islamist outliers like GSPC continue their actions, along with other AQIM fringe elements looking to establish strict Islamist ideology, the relationship between the United States and Tunisia will suffer as our national security policy will have to reflect, or account for, a tenuous relationship.

Morocco

The Failed State Index places Morocco at number 87 of 177 countries evaluated. Morocco has started a positive trend relative to the 2009 and 2010 indexes in that in both of these years they were ranked 71 and 73 respectively out of the 177 countries on the index.

As was discussed earlier, though, the 2011 index as it applies to Morocco, does not account for many of the issues, actions, and ramifications of the Arab Spring.

Looking again at the five strategic objectives, Morocco's record with terrorism, specifically terrorist sanctuary, is definitely a positive one. As a UN report notes, "The Government of Morocco, and frequently the King himself, regularly and strongly condemned terrorist acts, wherever they occurred."⁶² In addition to providing a physical presence in condemning terrorism in Morocco the King also initiated a program, in 2007, which focused on religious acceptance as a means of countering extremism. This program, known as "proximity strategy," directed "the rehabilitation of 3,180 mosques, the training of 33,000 imams, and increasing the number of regional Ulama councils from 30 to 70 across Morocco."⁶³ It is actions such as these, by the King and his government, that will endear Morocco to the United States and maintain it as an Arab ally of the United States.

This alliance has in fact endured for centuries. "It is this extensive network of relations – political and diplomatic, commercial and economic, military and security, and our common sense of purpose and commitment to economic reform and development that underscore the strength of the Moroccan-US relationship."⁶⁴ The relationship between the United States and Morocco goes back to Morocco being the first country to recognize U.S. Independence during the American Revolution. It became more official in the 18th Century with the signing of "Moroccan and American Treaty of Friendship" in 1786. Though

⁶². UNHCR. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 – Morocco*. RefWorld. Accessed 26 Apr 2012. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher_USDOS/MAR_49fac6a327_0.html.

⁶³. Ibid.

⁶⁴. Moroccan American Trade and Investment Council. *Morocco-US Relations*. Accessed 26 Apr 2012. <http://www.moroccanamericantrade.com/relations.cfm>.

probably not a major issue at the time, an indicator of the importance of this treaty was the two United States' signatories: ...Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. The longevity of this treaty, and subsequent diplomatic and military relationships between the United States and Morocco, led to significant intelligence assistance after 9/11 and reciprocal assistance from the US to Morocco in the aftermath of the 2003 bombing of Casablanca. The strength of this relationship provides credence to the second operational task dealing with Arab allies to the United States and the fact that, for the foreseeable future, the alliance between the United States and Morocco will remain strong. It also relates to the third operational task, which deals with the containment and diminishing of anti-American regimes and groups inside Morocco. Though there was an increase in anti-regime protests during the Arab Spring revolts in Morocco, the level of anti-Americanism was sufficiently managed by the government and the King.

Where Morocco is struggling, vis-à-vis the rest of the Maghreb is in the area of energy and resource security. Based on information provided by the United States Energy Administration (figure 4, accurate as of January 2012)⁶⁵ Morocco is completely dependent on other nations for its crude oil requirements. Tracking the data back through 1980, Morocco has never been in the oil production business in a manner that was economically viable. In addition, Morocco is also last in the Maghreb in natural gas production, topping out at

60,000,000 cubic
nearly

meters. This is
240,000,000

⁶⁵. Indexmundi. *Morocco*
<http://www.indexmundi.com/morocco>

26 Apr 2012.
[+consumption.](#)




Fig 4

cubic meters less than Tunisia, which is number three in natural gas production. Morocco's lack of energy and resource security could pose a potential risk to its stability should imports be affected by protests either in Morocco or in the export countries supplying the necessary petroleum and natural gas.

Though official diplomatic relations between Israel and Morocco have never been established, Morocco remains one of the staunchest friends of Israel in the Arab region. These close ties are, to a point, a result of the close ties Morocco has maintained with the United States. This connection plays at least a modest role in the maintenance of the survival of this non-Arab ally in the region.

Libya

The Failed State Index places Libya at 111 of 177 countries evaluated. Though the Failed States Index does not show data, information, and actions that have resulted from the Arab Spring, the all-out assault on the Gaddafi regime, and the eventual demise of the dictator and his regime, the data in hand give us some idea of the state's position regarding the five operational objectives. Examining the Failed States Indices from 2009, 2010, and 2011, Libya has remained at 111. One of the reasons identified for Libya remaining consistently at this level is its poor human rights record and its historical sponsorship of terrorism and terrorist sanctuaries.

Though it is perhaps in the process of doing so, the country has yet to make a successful transition to democracy. With a significant number of militias still moving unhindered throughout the country, the chances of another Libyan civil war erupting before the transitional government can effectively "transition" increase over time. Part of what is

fueling this unrest, in addition to the “unchecked militias,” is the continued demand for autonomy, and to a point a desire for secession, on the part of those Libyans residing in the eastern part of the country. Tribalism still has a significant place in Libyan the socioeconomic landscape. What must be understood is the fact that it was predominantly an Eastern revolt against the West, with significant assistance from NATO airpower, that overthrew Gaddafi. It is these Eastern tribes that are pushing for autonomy and the heavy Islamist flavor of their politics will continue to complicate the transition process. Another concern, as it applies to Libya, is the Tuareg mercenaries who were part of Gaddafi’s army. They have returned to Mali and are generating instability there as well as aligning themselves with AQIM. In fact, they played a major role in sparking the recent coup in Mali. These mercenaries, and their alignment with AQIM, have also complicated the formation of a national army. Without some form of security force to mitigate the actions of the Tuareg and their AQIM partners the likelihood of civil war continues. In addition these tribal organizations in the East that were responsible for the overthrow of Gaddafi are also in the area of the most prevalent oil production areas of the country, again lending credence to the skepticism of a smooth transition to a democratically elected government and ally to the United States.

According to John Davis;

“Libya is another well-known terrorist sanctuary housing not only Arab terrorist groups, but was also home to many European, communist and other terrorist organizations from around the world...one of the interesting realities is that the Libyan sponsored terrorist organizations that maintained bases in the country dominated the headlines in the 1970s and early 1980s.”⁶⁶

⁶⁶. John Davis, ed. *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. (UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2007), 9.

What changed this headline-grabbing reputation was President Reagan's order to launch air strikes in response to the Libyan-sponsored bombing of a Berlin disco in 1986. The recent events of the Arab Spring and the regime change that resulted from those actions, while holding forth the promise of a positive future, nonetheless make it very uncertain whether the new government will represent the democratic ideals for which the protesters fought, or whether it will even survive.

In line with the democratic ideals, which, in theory, are developing in Libya and its new government, the United States hopes to develop the new Libya into an Arab ally. The international community will be monitoring the progress of the new government for signs of radicalism but, to a point, the method, form, and function of the government that leads Libya into the future must be one of its own choosing without interference from the West. Despite the ruling body in Libya banning any parties with a religious affiliation, local Islamist parties are still fighting the decision. An area of concern is that the most organized of these parties is the Muslim Brotherhood and, if the pending elections in Algeria and those held in Tunisia are any indication, the likelihood of an Islamist majority inside Libyan politics is a foregone conclusion. Therefore, the likelihood of Libya becoming a reliable United States ally in the region, given that it was not one prior to the Arab Spring, is very low.

Based on the assumption that the Islamists will do well in the coming elections, should the Muslim Brotherhood or any other strong Islamist party prevail, there is a very real possibility that the tide could turn against Western or US relations. There is little chance for a return to the terrorist-sanctuary days of the 1970s and 1980s. However, instability in the

region based on a heavy Islamist focus across three of the four Maghreb countries could be problematic for the development and execution of US National Security policy in the region.

One of the key issues driving the development and execution of this policy is the ability to contain the development of anti-American regimes or groups inside Libya. As noted earlier, it is doubtful that the days of terrorist sanctuary will return, but the very perception of anti-Americanism, supported by government actions, will draw radical elements to this area. The presence of these elements will create a de facto sanctuary unless the government publicly renounces the groups in question. Again, the perception, internationally, will be that Libya is providing sanctuary to terrorist groups or organizations.

One of the positive aspects of Libya's future, though, is its energy and resource security. Using crude oil production and consumption as metric to compare it across the Maghreb, Libya fares better than Morocco and Tunisia, where the countries'




Fig 5

consumption outpaces their production. Between Algeria and Tunisia, both countries are relatively even in the production rate (see Fig 5)⁶⁷. Both Libya and Algeria are relatively even on natural gas production as well. The ability to maintain energy and resource security, then, is much less a

⁶⁷. Indexmundi. *Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 26 Apr 2012. <http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.

question than the relationship each country will have with the West. In Libya's case this remains to be seen as the new government forms.

An additional factor that will have an impact on that relationship is where the new government places its emphasis with regard to the Arab/Israeli issue. We must disregard past reputations, at least to a point, if the emerging government is to have an honest chance to change its past views regarding Israel. That said, the former regime, though never directly involved in combat with Israel, was a staunch supporter of the Palestinians and provided support through terrorist groups and training sites. The new government, if it values a relationship with the United States, must at the very least not come down firmly against Israel. Simply put, Libya's degree of support for Israel will be a telling sign of its desire for positive relations with the United States, marginal interaction, or outright enmity.

The information provided in the Failed States Index, principally from 2009-2011, outlines information across a host of metrics dealing with the four countries of the Maghreb. In addition, Index Mundi also provides detailed information on both crude oil and natural gas production, which was pulled from the United States Department of Energy. From the perspective of these data, and those of other ancillary studies and polls, a succinct picture of the Maghreb's stability, and the implications for US National Security concerns across the region (as associated with the five strategic objectives), emerges. Of the four countries of the Maghreb, Libya remains the great unknown. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Morocco represents the most secure regarding its impact on the development of US National Security Policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. Algeria and Tunisia, while both stable for the moment, represent the "middle" of the Maghreb. The recommendations and conclusions

associated with the three possible scenarios in the Maghreb follow in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This discussion of the Maghreb region and its impact on the development of US National Security policy now comes down to the impact that these countries will have on the future of the Arab World and its relations with the West and specifically the United States. Chapter one set the foundation for this work by discussing the history of the Maghreb, and its individual countries, across the last few centuries. This contextual discussion is pivotal to the research because it lends itself to how the various countries, and in turn the region, operate both locally and internationally. Chapter two took the next step by examining the significance of this research, focusing on the potential implications of US support to the overall UN and NATO effort in Libya. Chapter three outlines case studies of the various Maghreb countries. Through this examination a foundation of each country's history and mindset was established. Chapter four outlines the key issues that led to the eruption of protests during the Arab Spring and the initial migration to a more holistic democratic mindset across the Maghreb. Finally, this chapter brings the analyses in previous ones together in an attempt to provide potential issues for further consideration in the development of US National Security Policy in the region.

How the Maghreb countries develop, or continue to develop, in light of the results of the Arab Spring will provide insight into to how the United States approaches National Security policy for this region. The final part of this study provides some measure of

analysis regarding what the future holds for the Maghreb. In order to have a cogent discussion of the future of the Maghreb and its effect on US National Security Policy development, we must view the historical case studies through the lens of the three possible outcomes stated in the beginning of this study;

- 1) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and Regime Change of a Pro-American Ally, which is detrimental to US National Security Interests.
- 2) The Arab Spring leads to internal conflict and Regime Change in an Anti-American regime, which produces a positive change in US National Security Interests.
- 3) The Arab Spring leads to a protracted civil war and national dismemberment in one or more states within the region, which harms US National Security Interests.

Chapters Three and Four established the foundation for examining the various affects the Maghreb has regionally as well as internationally. Chapter Three's discussion of the individual countries in a case-study format provides a background on the establishment and evolution of each country. Chapter Four expanded on this by looking at data such as crude oil and natural resources as a means of rank-ordering the four countries in terms of their prospects for stability and friendship with the U.S.. The next logical step, in an effort to understand how the events of 2010/2011 will affect US National Security development, is to examine the four countries across multiple data sets. The main

data sets used in this study come from The Fund For Peace's Failed States Index, Information provided by the CIA World Fact Book (Economy Watch, Nation Master, and Index Mundi), and data on Muslim-Western Relations.

Rank	Country	Demographic Pressure	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Development	Poverty and Decline	Legitimacy of the State	Public Services	Human Rights and Rule of Law	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	Total
81	Algeria	6.4	6.1	7.8	5.7	6.8	5.2	7.1	6.1	7.5	7.2	6.8	5.3	78.0
87	Morocco	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.4	7.5	6.0	6.9	6.6	6.4	5.9	6.3	4.9	76.3
108	Tunisia	5.1	3.4	5.6	5.2	6.6	5.0	7.2	5.3	7.7	7.0	6.8	4.8	70.1
111	Libya	5.1	4.6	6.0	3.9	6.9	4.6	7.3	4.3	8.3	5.9	7.0	4.4	68.7

Fig 6

Maghreb Country Comparison

Comparing the countries of the Maghreb falls into two categories, as applicable to this research. Category one is the condition and rankings of the various countries prior to the events of the Arab Spring. The Failed States Index uses “publicly available sources to analyze 177 countries and rate them on 12 indicators of pressure on the state”⁶⁸. Figure 6⁶⁹ shows the relative rank and score of each of the countries of the Maghreb. The important point here, in relation to the development of U.S. National Security policy, is the analysis of group grievance; uneven development; legitimacy of the state; and fractionalized elites. These four indicators lend themselves, specifically, to the stability of the country writ large. How the population sees the government (legitimacy of the state) can be tied to its understanding of the development of the country and the gap between the elites and the common citizens (uneven development and fractionalized elites) which leads to the issues the population either blames the government for or holds those in power responsible (group grievance). While across all 12 indicators Algeria tends to be most stable followed by Morocco, Tunisia and Libya, when the four specific indicators are examined, Libya and Morocco are in a statistical tie at number 2, with 27.2 and 27.1 respectively, and Tunisia at

⁶⁸. Fund for Peace. *Failed States Index 2011*. Foreign Policy. Accessed 12 May 2012.
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates>.

⁶⁹. Ibid.

26.2. Looking at the four indicators individually, Algeria is the worst from a group grievance standpoint. Morocco is the worst from an uneven development standpoint, Tunisia is not the worst in any category, and Libya is the worst in the indicators of fractionalized elites and uneven development. How this plays out with the new governments that have emerged, and the changes made within the government of Morocco, will have to be closely watched. However, if the underlying issues across these indicators do not substantively change we can expect the instability that resulted from the events of the Arab Spring, as well as the unrest present prior to those actions, to remain bad or get worse.

Index Mundi provided another set of data, supported by information contained in the CIA World Fact Book, that outlines various government, demographic, economic, and




Fig 7

transnational issues to name a few. Based on this data set, centering on the importance of median age and school life expectancy (education) as they lend themselves to the overall understanding of

governmental structures and the importance of individual

human rights, the countries of the Maghreb are rank-ordered in accordance with figures 7 and 8⁷⁰. While

Libya has the lowest median age, which would tend to

support more random uprising and unrest, it also has the highest




Fig 8

expected

education achievement, which would tend to support an understanding of the expectations of governmental responsibility. What this data also supports is the desire of the general

⁷⁰. Indexmundi. *Median Age*[Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia]. Accessed 12 May 2012. <http://www.indexmundi.com/africa.html>.

population, as shown during the Arab Spring, for a more democratic or representative government within Libya.

Muslim-Western relations, as applicable to this research, are outlined in much of the work done by the Abu Dhabi Gallup Poll Forum of 2011.

“The Abu Dhabi Gallup Center (ADGC) set out to measure how favorably people in majority Muslim and Western countries viewed relations between these societies...while no one measure can capture every variable involved in Muslim-West relations, the ADGC drew on Gallup’s global research of the past six years to identify three key dimensions, which together make up the Muslim-West Perceptions Index.”⁷¹ (see figure 9⁷²).

Germany and Malaysia are included in this chart for reference purposes in an effort to better understand the relative position Libya occupies regarding positive attitudes toward Muslim-Western Relations. Tunisia presents the most positive trend toward these relations, but it remains to be seen if the new government maintains that trend. In addition, as depicted in figure 9, three of the four countries are between the 75th and 50th percentile, which shows some measure of stability if these figures remain constant in the wake of the changes in leadership and government in the identified countries. Libya, however, remains below the 25th percentile, which constitutes a

negative trend with regard to stability as well as its effect on the development of US National Security Policy in the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa, Gulf Most Positive Toward Muslim-West Relations			somewhat
	Index Score	Percentile	
Tunisia	75	75	◀ 75 th Percentile
Morocco	68	58	
Algeria	65	56	
Germany	62	50	◀ 50 th Percentile
Malaysia	49	25	◀ 25 th Percentile
Libya	48	23	

Fig 9

⁷¹. Gallup. *Abu Dhabi Gallup Forum, December 2011*. Accessed 12 May 2012.

<http://www.gallup.com/se/ms/153866/abu-dhabi-gallup-forum-key-findings-muslim-west-relations.aspx>.

⁷². Ibid.

In discussing the Arab spring specifically, there is valuable information to be had from an examination of the time distance between the initial protests and recognized change in governmental actions. Figure 10 (Protest to Change) shows this broken down by the initial




Fig 10

protest, a significant shift in the approach taken by the government, or interim government, and then when such changes became official. As outlined in the figure, the average time from protest to change is between seven and twelve months across the Maghreb. Though there is

nothing explicit regarding the larger implications of these timelines, they do tell us that the desire for change is strong enough to put in place new measures relatively quickly (7-12 months). However, this also breeds some measure of skepticism. With such dramatic change occurring so quickly, there is a strong possibility of abuse of power and establishment of a less democratic structure than has been envisioned.

From a post-Arab Spring perspective, category two, the country rankings remain to be seen. One would assume that based on the length and violence of Libya's revolt that it would remain as most prone to failed state status. However, the resurgence of Islamist participation in the governments of all of the Maghreb countries could be a telling sign toward success or failure depending on the level of secular inclusion, or isolation, the new governments support.

Cross Reference of Propositions

In order to complete the discussion established with the various data sets provided it is essential to cross-reference the information with the propositions presented at the

beginning of this document. Based on the analyzed data sets, and the background of the various countries of the Maghreb, Figure 11 cross-references the three propositions to the identified countries. For clarification, a score of zero means the proposition probably is not correct, while a score of five represents the realization that something did happen but the results are yet to be seen. A score of ten represents the high likelihood that the proposition is correct relative to the specific country. Finally, information discovered during the research portion of this thesis also shows there is some amount of influence exerted by Islamist parties in each of the four countries. This information is depicted as well in an effort to better illustrate the effect that the events of the Arab Spring could potentially have on US/Maghreb relations.




Fig 11

Recommendations

In analyzing the available data and information, there are certain issues that emerge relative to the development of US National Security Policy toward the Maghreb region writ large and toward the individual countries. As the impact of events during the Arab Spring become more evident, the influence they will have on the development of our approach toward the Maghreb will also become more relevant. The recommendations contained in this section will be outlined by country with a final point on the Maghreb as a whole.

Of the 177 countries analyzed in the Fund for Peace's Failed States Index, Algeria is ranked number 81, which also places Algeria as the least likely of all the Maghreb countries to become a failed state. One of the aspects of Algeria that supports this stability is the fact

that it is one of the leading crude oil producers in the Maghreb. Unfortunately, Algeria ranks in the 56th percentile on positive relations between the West and Muslim nations. In relation to the Arab Spring, Algeria had the greatest time distance between the initial protests and final official change as a result of the protests. Algeria also is ranked second and third in median age and school life expectancy. The median age and the expectations for educational success lend themselves to long-term stability as well. Another positive point, based on the four propositions, is that the research shows Algeria may represent one of the positive highlights across the Maghreb for a continued stable relationship with the United States. That said, the overall analysis shows Algeria is questionable regarding stability based on some of the activities of AQIM. The camps and training that are located and occurring sporadically within the borders, and the kidnapping of Algerian officials by AQIM and surrogates, continue to be concerning from a stability standpoint as well as a human security/human rights standpoint.

Libya is ranked 111 of the 177 countries on the Failed States Index. While that leads to questions of its long-range stability a positive aspect of the research is the fact that though the median age in Libya is young its school life expectancy is the highest of the Maghreb. An educated population has a greater capability to work on improving its situation than does a less educated population. The transitional government, though still in its infancy, represents that capability to make long-lasting and stable changes in its government. Unfortunately, however, Libya still ranks in the 23rd percentile regarding its attitude on positive relations between Muslims and the West. A final note of concern deals with the unknown future of this transitional government, and specifically with the widespread

successes of Islamist parties across the Maghreb. The concern with Libya is that they have yet to make the transition. While elections are scheduled, the record of successful elections in the region is suspect. Complicating the transition process is the number of militias roaming the country, to include mercenaries that were part of Gaddafi's army. A major concern with these rebel mercenaries is their access to weapons after Gaddafi's fall. If left uncontrolled, these weapons, and the mercenaries and/or Islamist groups that control them, will be a significant threat not only to the emerging government in Libya but also to the region's governments as a whole. There is also significant unrest in the eastern area of the country, whose residents are calling for secession. All of these issues make Libya the most risky for future democratic government and continued relations with the United States.

Morocco was the least affected, governmentally, by the Arab Spring. The constitutional monarchy remains in power, albeit with some significant concessions by Mohammed VI. Morocco ranks 87th on the Failed States Index, placing it right behind Algeria as number two among the Maghreb countries. What puts Morocco in danger is the fact that it is a consumer of crude oil, placing it on its own within the Maghreb as the only country with no crude oil production capability. However, Morocco's median age and school life expectancy provide some stability in that it is ranked third and fourth respectively. In addition to this they rank at the 58th percentile in having a positive outlook on Muslim West relations. One of the remaining concerns is how Morocco lines up against the presented propositions. In this vein it is a statistical wash as there was no protracted civil war, and the decisions of the government will be the telling signs as to the relationship it maintains with the West. Compounding this issue is the significant influence the Islamist

party now has within the government. The actions of the Arab Spring had the least effect on the Moroccan government. King Mohammed VI's approach has allowed for a more transparent approach to government, though with the added concern, as addressed above, of an increased Islamist participation. This increase in Islamist participation represents the first time an Islamist party has been the majority in Moroccan politics. Though the transparency is a major indicator of a desire for a more democratic process, the resultant Islamist success remains a cause for concern.

Tunisia is ranked 108 out of 177 on the Failed States Index. This places it third of the four Maghreb countries. While Tunisia historically maintained a fairly large production rate of crude oil, it has steadily decreased over the past 10-15 years, being surpassed by both Algeria and Libya. What speaks to its chances of continued stability is the median age and educational focus. Tunisia is first in median age and second in school life expectancy. However, they are at the 75th percentile regarding their attitude toward positive Muslim-Western relations. It is too early to determine how stable the US/Tunisian relationship will be. The area of concern is similar to the other countries in that there is a heavy Islamist influence in Tunisia that could contribute either way. Of the four countries of the Maghreb, Tunisia is the most secular. Tunisia's recent elections, as in other countries, have shown a pronounced increase in Islamist party participation. While the Islamist and secular parties are working well together, one of the major concerns remains the condition of the economy, which is worsening, and the rise of criminal activity. Both of these issues may be fueled by Islamist elements displeased with the approach their Islamist party is taking by forming a coalition with secular political parties.

Across the Maghreb, the results of the Arab Spring have yet to be fully realized. With the continuing redeployment of American and NATO forces out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the constant movement of Al Qaeda factions looking for refuge, and the continued rhetoric toward Israel from Iran, the Maghreb region will remain a potentially strategic position. Morocco represents the most stable government and one that may serve as a key ally in developing a positive influence in the region. Libya, on the other hand, represents the area of greatest concern within the region based on its current transitional government. Though it is on track, according to the current leadership, to conduct various elections, there is enough upheaval still occurring that a successful electoral process is questionable. Tunisia and Algeria both hold hope, but the Islamist influence in Tunisia and AQIM's activities in Algeria remain significant issues of concern as the United States continues to monitor the situation in the Maghreb. This region of the globe, as stated earlier, will remain of strategic interest to the United States because of the effects it can levy on the Mediterranean's commerce through the Straits of Gibraltar as well as the American military traffic—three Marine Expeditionary Units a year at the very least—that passes in proximity to the Maghreb region's coastal areas.

While alluded to across this research, there are two items that warrant additional discussion: the Islamist influence on Western and US policy, and the concern of AQIM protection by Taureg rebels. As the governments of the Maghreb adjust their policies to the desires of their populations or, as in Libya's case, develop an entirely new government, the concerns of Islamists have become key policy and societal issues. If they are to remain relevant in the political process, these two issues will definitely merit careful consideration in

Western and US policymakers' approach to the region. For clarity, this discussion is divided between the European Union and the United States.

The European Union's relationship with the Maghreb region goes all the way back to the colonial period, when France and Italy were key players. That relationship has now grown to include the EU writ large based on the societal and economic ties Europe has with its neighbors in the Maghreb. The emerging prominence of Islamist parties, beginning back in the early 1990s, is something Europe is looking to leverage in increasing the democratization foundation of the region that was instituted with the Arab Spring. As two prominent scholars have noted, "One of the main aspects of the European Union's (EU) new Neighbourhood Policy towards countries of the Maghreb is the strengthening of the process of democratisation."⁷³ What this will provide, from a political standpoint, for Europe, is the potential of a more stable region within Europe's sphere of influence. The major impact Islamists have on Europe, though, is of great concern: "Since the mid-90's, however, these parties have tried to embrace Europe's Muslim population in three ways: by presenting themselves as defenders of the rights of European Muslim minorities; conducting electoral campaigns towards nationals living in Europe during respective elections in Morocco and Algeria and, finally, engaging in an external-relations policy destined to the EU's public authorities."⁷⁴ This becomes a concern, specifically, for countries like France that have had connections with the Maghreb for hundreds of years and have increasingly large Muslim populations within their borders.

⁷³. Amel Boubekeur and Samir Amghar. *Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and Their Links with EU: Mutual Influences and the Dynamics of Democratisation*. EUROMESCO Paper 55, October, 2006. Executive Summary. Accessed 20 May, 2012. http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/images/55_eng.pdf.

⁷⁴. Ibid.

From the perspective of the United States, the emerging Islamist power provides both a threat and an opportunity. As discussed by Yahia H. Zoubir, in The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security, the United States has concerns in the Maghreb from both an energy and security standpoint: “The first are linked to America’s energy needs, and focus on oil and gas... they also favour the development of a stronger regional entity... especially since competition has heightened with China’s recent gains in Africa”⁷⁵ From a military or security perspective the area is of specific policy interest because of what it provides in the realm of eliminating AQIM and other rouge groups from establishing training and operational bases in the ungoverned or under-governed regions of the Maghreb. Indeed, “These increased the need for new ways of managing issues related to security, Islamism, terrorism and, for a time, democratization. Most area specialists agree that problems of terrorism, illegal migration and trafficking of all kinds are epiphenomena that cannot be understood in isolation from the roots that engender them.”⁷⁶ In an effort to conclude this portion of the discussion, the main implications of an Islamist majority within the Maghreb really center on the desire for success. If the current Islamist parties are to succeed, it will require a realization of the direction their base of power wants government to pursue and the realization that in order to be successful will require some compromise on the economic front. In the end, if the democratization of the Maghreb is to be a success, it will require a delicate balance between religious importance and a more liberal economic approach to the West.

⁷⁵. Yahia H. Zoubir. *The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Security*. International Affairs 85: 5. (NJ: Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009), 977.

⁷⁶. Ibid.

This discussion on the impact of Islamists in the emerging governments of the Maghreb is directly related to the second point of expansion, which includes the coordination, activities, and limited success of AQIM in Mali. While not a part of the Maghreb, Mali plays a strategic role in that it has, up to this point, provided safe haven for rebels and AQIM, and will clearly continue to do so in the wake of the recent coup. The current military and government forces in Mali have been unable to quell the actions and operations of these groups to include the most recent attacks resulting in “the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad” (MNLA), which seized Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, the three major cities of northern Mali that lie within the region the Tuareg rebel group refers to as ‘Azawad.’”⁷⁷ An inability to control this region will have potential impacts on Algeria and the greater Maghreb region. As the United States develops its policy toward the region it must consider the implications of countries outside the Maghreb, specifically Mali’s current instability, because of their impacts on the emerging democratic institutions and the view, by these extremist groups, of a heavy Western/US influence.

Conclusion

There is significant change occurring across the Middle East and the Arab World driven by the events of the Arab Spring. The Maghreb represents a strategic position within the Arab World and in the area of the Mediterranean Sea. How the United States approaches these changes will be pivotal to maintaining diplomatic and physical access required to

⁷⁷. Lesley Anne Warner. *Instability in Mali Complicates Regional Approach to AQIM*. World Politics Review. Accessed 20 May, 2012. <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11809/instability-in-mali-complicates-regional-approach-to-aqim>.

leverage this strategic position. The heavy Islamist influence that is being seen in Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya could be problematic as well. Much of the Islamist rhetoric to date is counter to democratic ideals. However, in at least one case, Tunisia, the Islamist party won a significant number of seats in government and has made a pledge not to enforce Shari'a Law. While this is a positive result of the Arab Spring in at least one country, it remains to be seen if the attitude will hold and what the reactions are from neighboring Maghreb countries.

The main unknown remains Libya. In Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria there was limited upheaval in government. Both Algeria and Morocco maintained their governments through the conflict and Tunisia, though Ben Ali went into exile, still had a relatively smooth transition. Libya is a concern for three reasons. First, there was a protracted conflict resulting in the removal of Gaddafi and his subsequent assassination; second, there was significant outside assistance to the rebels from NATO, with the US providing air and intelligence assets; and finally, while there are positive steps underway, such as the registration of voters for the upcoming National Congress elections, there is still a great deal of uncertainty surrounding Libyan politics and government. The relative stability of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco are definite positive aspects of the post Arab Spring transition. However, the instability that exists in Libya, combined with AQIM's continued capability to operate from Mali and southern Algeria, make the Maghreb region a potential flash point in Arab/West relations. It also makes the Maghreb region of strategic interest to the United States.

Some key points, in conclusion, deal with what the demographics of the region tell us with regard to unrest and upheaval. The median male age in three of the four countries is

between 24 and 26 years of age. Tunisia is slightly higher at approximately 28. This is the primary age range of those that were the key players in the Arab Spring. Compounding the problem of the Maghreb and its relation with the United States is the relative decline in global status of the West and the U.S. specifically. While there was significant assistance provided to rebel forces in Libya it does not counter the substantive increase in prominence across the region of the Islamists. The traditional anti-western ideology of Islamist based parties and groups remain the legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood from its 1928 fight against British colonial rule. The Muslim Brotherhood, through proxy groups, has maintained a foothold in Maghreb politics and, for the most part (Tunisian being a potential exception) has maintained a rejection of secular law as it gives the perception of destroying Islam. As the United States goes forward in its diplomatic support of the Maghreb countries during their period of transition it will be imperative that the dialogue on Islamist parties, Israel, and secular law be continued. It is only through understanding the background, motivations, and aspirations of the countries of the Maghreb region that the United States stands a chance at developing a relevant and coherent National Security Policy applicable to the operational and strategic interests of the region.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abadi, Jacob. *Algeria's Policy Toward Israel: Pragmatism and Rhetoric*. The Middle East Journal, Vol 56, Autumn 2002. (Washington D.C.: Middle East Institute, 2002), 616-617.
- Alam, Anwar. *Islam, Bread Riots and Democratic Reforms in North Africa*. Islam and Muslim Societies, A Science Journal. Accessed 11 March 2012.
http://www.muslimsocieties.org/Vol_4_No_1_Islam_Bread_Riots_and_Democratic_Reforms.html#.
- Alexander, Christopher. *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Aljazeera. *Final Tunisian election results announced*. Aljazeera. Accessed 11 March 2012.
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/11/20111114171420907168.html>.
- Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1969.
- Bennoune, Mahfoud. *The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987: Colonial Upheavals and Post-Independent Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Boubekeur, Amel and Samir Amghar. *Islamist Parties in the Maghreb and Their Links with EU: Mutual Influences and the Dynamics of Democratisation*. EUROMESCO Paper 55, October, 2006. Executive Summary. Accessed 20 May, 2012.
http://www.euromesco.net/euromesco/images/55_eng.pdf.
- Burke, Edmund III. *Prelude to Protectorates in Morocco; Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- Clancy-Smith, Julia, ed. *North Africa, Islam, and the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War*. OX: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 2001.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. *A Tragedy of Arms; Military and Security Developments in the Maghreb*. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2002.
- Cottrell, Alvin J. and James D. Theberge, Ed. *The Western Mediterranean: Its Political, Economic, and Strategic Importance*. New York: Prager, 1974.
- Council on Foreign Relations. *The New Arab Revolt*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2011.

- CQ Press. *The Political Handbook of the Middle East*, 2008. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2008.
- Davis, John, ed. *Africa and the War on Terrorism*. UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2007.
- Diab, Osama. *The Jasmine Revolution*. World Press.org. Accessed 19 March 2012.
<http://www.worldpress.org/Africa/3686.cfm>.
- Department of State. *Tunisia*. Country Reports on Terrorism, 2010. Accessed 22 Apr 2012.
<http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/resources/from-washington/2010-country-reports-on-terrorism.html>.
- Dodge, Toby and Richard Higgott. *Globalization and the Middle East: Islam, Economy, Society and Politics*. Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2002.
- Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s.v. "Maghreb." Accessed 03 February 2012.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/356614/Maghrib>.
- Energy Information Administration. *Algeria*. Country Analysis Briefs. Accessed 22 Apr 2012. <http://205.254.135.7/EMEU/cabs/Algeria/pdf.pdf>.
- Entelis, John P. ed. *Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa*. Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Fox, Robert. *The Inner Sea: The Mediterranean and its People*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
- Fromkin, David. *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*. New York: H. Holt, 2001.
- Fund for Peace. *The Failed States Index 2011*. Accessed 15 Mar 2012.
<http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2011>.
- Gallagher, Charles F. *The United States and North Africa; Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963.
- Gallup. *Abu Dhabi Gallup Forum, December 2011*. Accessed 12 May 2012.
<http://www.gallup.com/se/ms/153866/abu-dhabi-gallup-forum-key-findings-muslim-west-relations.aspx>.
- Gelvin, James L. *The Arab Uprising, What Everyone Needs to Know*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

- Goldschmidt, Author Jr and Lawrence Davidson. *A Concise History of the Middle East, Eighth Edition*. Colorado: Westview Press, 2006.
- Halm, Heinz. *The Arabs, A Short History*. Translated by Allison Brown and Thomas Lampert. New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007.
- Hamid, Shadi. "Tunisia, Birthplace of the Revolution". *The Arab Awakening*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011.
- Harvey, Derek. *The Reagan Doctrine, Morocco, and the Conflict in the Western Sahara: An Appraisal of United States Policy*. Thesis, University of Utah, 1988.
- Heggoy, Alf Andrew and Robert R. Crout. *Historical Dictionary of Algeria*. "African Historical Dictionaries, No. 28. NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1981.
- Heneghan, Tom. *Tunisia's Islamist-led Government Rejects Laws to Enforce Religion*. Al Arabiya News. Accessed 22 Apr 2012.
<http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/05/175612.html>.
- History World. *History of Tunisia*. Accessed 20 March 2012.
<http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ac93>.
- Indexmundi. *Algerian Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 25 Apr 2012.
<http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.
- _____. *Median Age[Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia]*. Accessed 12 May 2012.
<http://www.indexmundi.com/africa.html>.
- _____. *Moroccan Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 25 Apr 2012.
<http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.
- _____. *Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 25 Apr 2012.
<http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.
- _____. *Tunisian Crude Oil Production and Consumption by Year*. Accessed 25 Apr 2012.

- <http://www.indexmundi.com/energy.aspx?country=dz&product=oil&graph=production+consumption>.
- Keiswetter, Allen. *The Arab Spring: Implications for US Policy and Interest*. Washington DC: The Middle East Institute, 2011.
- Kramer, Martin. *Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideas in the Middle East*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996.
- Le Gall, Michel and Kenneth Perkins, eds. *The Maghrib in Question, Essays in History and Historiography*. Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1997.
- Martinez, Luis, translated from French by Jonathan Derrick. *The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998*. London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 1998.
- Mathias, Gregor, translated by Neal Surando. *Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice Versus Theory*. Santa Barbara: Praeger Security International, 2011.
- Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. *Algeria, A Country Study*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994.
- Millen, Raymond. *The Political Context behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies: Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79)*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March, 2008.
- Moroccan American Trade and Investment Council. *Morocco-US Relations*. Accessed 26 Apr 2012. <http://www.moroccanamericantrade.com/relations.cfm>
- Newell, Clayton R. *Egypt-Libya*. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1993.
- Nelson, Harold D., ed. *Tunisia, A Country Study*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
- Nickerson, Jane Soames. *A Short History of North Africa, From Pre-Roman Times to the Present; Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco*. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1961.
- Oxford Dictionaries. Oxford University Press, 2012. Accessed 11 March 2012. <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/Arab%2BSpring>.
- Perkins, Kenneth J. *A History of Modern Tunisia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

- Pollack, Kenneth M. *The Arab Awakening: America and the Transformation of the Middle East*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2011.
- Reid, Richard J. *A History of Modern Africa; 1800 to the Present*. Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
- Riedel, Bruce O. *Algeria, Whistling Past the Graveyard*. The Arab Awakening. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011.
- Rogan, Eugene. *The Arabs, A History*. New York: Basic Books, 2009.
- Rose, Gideon. *The New Arab Revolt; What Happened, What it Means, and What Comes Next*. New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 2011.
- Schueftan, Dan and Michael Singh. *Arab Spring, Arab Storm: Implications for Israel*. Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2011.
- Soltani, Bougerra. *After the Arab Spring, is Algeria Next in Line for an Islamist Election Victory*. World Crunch, All News is Global. Accessed 11 March 2012. <http://www.worldcrunch.com/after-arab-spring-algeria-next-line-islamist-election-victory/4588>.
- Spencer, Claire. *Adelphi Paper 274; The Maghreb in the 1990s*. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1993.
- St. John, Ronald Bruce. *Libya: Continuity and Change*. New York: Routledge, 2011.
- _____. *Libya and the United States: Two Centuries of Strife*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002.
- Tarwater, Alison. *French Colonization in the Maghreb: A Central Influence in Both Regions Today*. Accessed 20 March 2012. http://www.howardcc.edu/academics/academic_divisions/english/instructional/pdf/French_Colonization_in_the_Maghreb.pdf.
- The Associated Press. *Morocco's Arab Spring election won by Islamists*. USA Today News. Accessed 11 March 2012. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2011-11-27/morocco-elections-islamist-victory/51421964/1>.
- The International Energy Agency. *Key World Energy Statistics*. France: Soregraph, 2011.

- Thompson, William R. and David R. Dreyer. *The Handbook of International Rivalries, 1492-2010*. Washington DC: CQ Press, 2012.
- UNHCR. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2008 – Morocco*. RefWorld. Accessed 26 Apr 2012.
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,USDOS,,MAR,49fac6a327,0.html>.
- Vandewalle, Dirk. *A History of Modern Libya*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Warner, Lesley Anne. *Instability in Mali Complicates Regional Approach to AQIM*. World Politics Review. Accessed 20 May, 2012.
<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11809/instability-in-mali-complicates-regional-approach-to-aqim>.
- Werenfels, Isabelle. *Managing Instability in Algeria: Elites and Political Change since 1995*. New York: Routledge, 2007.
- Yom, Sean L. *Understanding the Resilience of Monarchy During the Arab Spring*. Foreign Policy Research Institute, E-Notes. Accessed 22 Apr 2012.
<http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201204.yom.monarchy-arab-spring.html>.
- Zoubir, Yahia H. *The United States and Maghreb-Sahel Secuirty*. International Affairs 85: 5. NJ: Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009.